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Abstract 
Understanding why certain jobs are ‘better’ than others and what implications they have for a 
worker’s career is clearly an important but still relatively unexplored question. We provide both a 
theoretical framework and a number of empirical results that help distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ 
jobs in terms of their impact on a worker’s lifetime wage income profile through wage jumps 
occurring upon changing job (‘static effects’) or through increases in the wage growth rate (‘dynamic 
effects’). We find that the distinction between internationally active firms and domestic firms is a 
meaningful empirical dividing line between employers providing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs. First, in 
internationally active firms the experience-wage profile is much steeper than in domestic firms, 
especially for managers as opposed to blue-collar workers. Second, the higher lifetime wage income 
for managers in internationally active firms relies on the stronger accumulation of experience that 
these firms allow for and on the (almost) perfect portability of the accumulated dynamic wage gains 
to other firms. Static effects are instead much more important for blue-collar workers. Finally, the 
distinction between internationally active and domestic firms is relevant also at a more aggregate level 
to explain cross-sectional differences in wages among workers and spatial differences in average 
wages across regions within a country. 
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1. Introduction
“Most microeconomic research...focuses on individual behavior and decision-making: examples
include the choice of schooling, responses to welfare programs and tax reforms, and decisions
about marriage and family. Most people, however, if asked to identify the key to economic success,
will say ‘getting a good job.’ ” David Card, Robert J. Lampman Memorial Lecture, 2013.
Understanding why certain jobs are better than others and what implications they have
for workers’ current and future career is clearly important. A large body of empirical
research has focused on obtaining estimates for the return of experience and seniority
(Dustmann and Meghir, 2005), wage growth (Lagakos et al., 2018) and wage inequality
(Song et al., 2018). It is, however, not straightforward to identify and separate ‘good’
from ‘bad’ jobs. For example, most people would agree that, for an IT specialist, working
for Google does represent a ‘good’ job in the sense that it provides a vibrant work
environment and can change a worker’s entire career, thereby substantially affecting the
worker’s lifetime wage income. But evaluation might get more complex and debatable
when considering other occupations or workplaces. Moreover, it is unclear whether the
positive effect that a ‘good’ job has on lifetime wage income is mainly due to a static
effect (i.e. a ‘wage jump’ upon taking the job) or to a dynamic effect (i.e. faster ‘wage
growth’ after taking the job) and whether the benefits of a ‘good’ job, be they static or
dynamic, are ‘portable’ or are lost when moving to another job. Finally, the distinction
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs might not be the same for every worker, and might depend
both on the occupation and the skill or ability of the worker.
The aim of this paper is to provide both a theoretical framework and a number of
empirical results that draws the line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs for different types of
workers in terms of static effects, dynamic effects, and their portability. In principle, as
discussed by Clark (2005), the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ good job is highly
multidimensional as it involves: pay (including basic benefits like health insurance,
paid vacation, paid sick leave, or paid paternal leave); hours of work (including any
mismatch between actual and desired hours); future prospects (self-reported promotion
opportunities and job security); hard work (self-reported exhaustion, hard physical work,
stress, and working in dangerous conditions); job content (self-reported interesting job,
job helps other people, job is useful to society, and autonomy); and interpersonal relation-
ships (with management and co-workers). In our theoretical model we collapse all these
multifaceted aspects into three key dimensions: wage, experience and opportunities. In
this respect, a ‘good’ job offers higher wage, more performance-enhancing experience
and more opportunities to exploit such experience. It is, however, also associated with a
more demanding and stressful environment. The tradeoff between these pros and cons
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depends on workers’ characteristics in terms of ability and life circumstances (‘ambition’)
that cannot be foreseen with certainty and affect the relevance of career development as
a priority with respect to other considerations. To prepare the ground for the empirical
analysis, the model identifies ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs with ‘good’ and ‘bad’ employers.
After all, as the previous Google example suggests, what most people have in mind
when they refer to a ‘good’ job is, by and large, a ‘good’ employer.
The result is an imperfect sorting model in the spirit of De la Roca et al. (2020) where
uncertainty operates based on the premise that the return to experience is higher for
more able workers irrespective of the type of firm and disproportionately so in firms
offering better career development. The model is consistent with several career paths.
More specifically, it predicts that low ability workers work for ‘bad’ firms both in the
junior and senior periods of their career. By contrast, high ability workers work for
‘good’ firms both as junior and as senior, unless they turn out to be ‘unambitious’, in
which case they prefer a ‘bad’ firm as senior employer. Intermediate ability workers
work for ‘bad’ (‘good’) firms as junior and ‘good’ (‘bad’) firms as senior if the advantage
of working for ‘good’ firms is stronger in terms of opportunities as senior (experience as
junior) than experience as junior (opportunities as senior). Yet, some of them end up in
‘bad’ firms both as junior and as senior if they turn out to be ‘unambitious’.
The model highlights three fundamental issues for the empirical analysis. The first
issue concerns the distinction between ‘wage jump’ and ‘wage growth’. Wage jumps
occur when workers move between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ firms, while changes in wage growth
occur when workers start accumulating more or less valuable experience within ‘bad’
and ‘good’ firms. The second issue concerns the ‘portability’ of experience. In the model
higher wage growth enjoyed by workers in ‘good’ firms stays with them when they move
to ‘bad’ firms due to more valuable experience. We thus need to distinguish between ex-
perience that is potentially useful in other firms and experience that is specific to a given
firm (‘tenure’). The third issue concerns the complementarities among ability, experience
and opportunities. In the model wage growth effects are stronger for better workers,
which implies that workers are heterogeneous and sort across jobs. Yet sorting on ability,
that will be measured by worker fixed effects in our empirical analysis, is imperfect
because of the presence of factors (‘ambition’ in our model) that are unobservable to
the econometrician. This implies that equally able workers could take different career
paths so allowing to separately identify the role played by differences in experience and
opportunities across firms on one side and differences in ability across workers on the
other side.
Our empirical analysis exploits Portuguese matched employer-employee data (Quadros
the Pessoal) over the period 1991-2006, along with firm-level trade and ownership data,
allowing us, among other, to retrieve a comprehensive measure of remuneration, that
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we simply label wage, including basic remuneration, overtime remuneration, regular
bonuses and allowances, and irregular bonuses and allowances. We focus on managers
and their employers, while using blue-collar workers for comparison. In particular, we
study ‘young’ managers who were at most 18 years old at the beginning of our sample
period and whom we can thus follow during their entire career. As for the employers,
we partition them according to their international status while also providing comple-
mentary results based on size and hierarchical complexity partitioning. Specifically, we
classify exporting, importing and foreign-owned firms as ‘internationally active’ and all
other firms as ‘domestic’. We then construct measures of managers’ overall experience,
international experience and domestic experience. The first measure corresponds to the
standard measure of work experience used in the literature: years of potential experience
computed as the number of years elapsed since a manager finished school. The second
measure refers to the number of years in which a manager worked for internationally
active firms. The third measure refers to the complement to international experience.
Both the premise and the predictions of our theoretical model find strong support
in the data when we associate ‘good’ and ‘bad’ firms with internationally active and
domestic firms respectively. In particular, the premise is consistent with two robust
patterns. First, sales growth in internationally active firms is higher than in domestic
firms. This result is robust to a number of controls — including firm age and size — and
holds both in the full population sample and in the sub-sample of young managers and
their employers. Moreover, sales growth is positively related to the ‘stock’ of international
experience embodied in firms’ management. Second, wage growth in internationally
active firms is higher than in domestic firms, especially for managers. This result applies
to both manufacturing and services firms, is robust to a number of controls, and holds
both in the full population sample and in the sub-sample of young managers and their
employers. These patterns are consistent with internationally active firms providing
better experience and opportunities for managers as reflected in steeper sales growth
for the former and steeper wage growth for the latter.
As for the model’s predictions, we estimate a series of Mincerian wage equations
and carefully deal with the issues of unobservables and selection. For our baseline
results we employ a large set of covariates along with different combinations of fixed
effects. We further report very similar results based on a more exogenous source of
variation in the data, namely firm closure and job displacement, while establishing that
our findings are robust to a large number of robustness checks: controlling for firm
heterogeneity in terms of payment structures and, in particular, in the extent to which
firms resort to performance pay schemes; allowing for different wage profiles for more
or less educated managers; controlling for wage patterns dictated by on-the-job-search,
wage bargaining and outside offers; accounting for career concerns models’ dynamics;
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abstracting from the difference between experience and tenure in the firm; allowing
tenure to have a different impact between internationally active and domestic firms; and
adopting different functional forms for domestic and international experience.
Our empirical analysis consistently points towards the following results: (i) the wage
premium of internationally active firms is driven by a higher return on international
experience, as compared to domestic experience, rather than by wage jumps or worker
selection; (ii) the higher return on international experience is substantial, stacking up to
a 11-20 percent wage gap over 10 years; (iii) both domestic and international experience
are fully portable across firms; (iv) one more year of domestic or international experience
is more valuable to better managers in both domestic and internationally active firms; (v)
differences in international experience across managers explain a substantial portion of
both the cross-sectional and spatial distributions of wages; (vi) the distinction between
internationally active and domestic firms is more powerful in capturing the dynamics of
managers’ wages than the distinction between large and small firms or the distinction
between firms with many or few hierarchical layers of management; (vii) when consid-
ering blue-collar workers, there is no evidence of a differential return between domestic
and international experience while wage jumps are the main driver of the internationally
active firms’ wage premium.1
Result (vi) is consistent with popular rankings in which the best employers tend to be
large multinational public companies.2 It is also consistent with the findings of recent
research at the intersection between international trade and management, according to
which, besides being larger and more productive, internationally active firms pay higher
wages (Bernard et al., 2007, Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008) and are also more vibrant
workplaces thanks to better management practices, managers with more diversified
experience, and relationships, as buyer or sellers, with a larger and more diversified
number of counterparts. For instance, Bloom et al. (2016), using original survey data on
management practices on over 11,000 firms in 34 countries between 2004 and 2014, find
that plants that belong to multinationals use management practices that are better than
those of domestic firms. Bloom et al. (2018), using plant-level data for 485 Chinese firms
in 1999-2008 and over 10,000 US firms in 2010, find that better managed firms are more
likely to start exporting, export more to more destinations, use higher quality inputs and
source inputs from more countries of origin. Mion and Opromolla (2014), using matched
1In this respect our analysis expands upon Dustmann and Meghir (2005) by, among other, distin-
guishing between experience acquired when working for ‘bad’ and ‘good’ firms while at the same time
quantifying the heterogeneity of the returns to both types of experience with respect to ability. Regarding
the latter, Dustmann and Meghir (2005) allow for heterogeneous returns to experience by means of random
coefficients and so they ultimately provide estimates of average (across workers) returns to experience.
2See, for example, www.forbes.com/lists/worlds-best-employers or www.greatplacetowork.com/best-
workplaces.
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employer-employee and trade transaction data for Portuguese firms between 1995 and
2005, show that having a manager with previous export experience is a key driver of
export performance.
Finally, we show that the distinction between internationally active and domestic firms
is relevant not only to explain individual careers, but also at a more aggregate level.
When studying cross-sectional differences in wages among managers, the explanatory
power of international experience is comparable to that of overall experience and to
the combined explanatory power of firm-level controls including size, age, and produc-
tivity. When studying spatial differences in average wages across Portuguese regions,
we find a high correlation with the average international experience of local managers.
A counterfactual experiment that eliminates differences in the share of overall experi-
ence corresponding to international experience across regions reduces the coefficient
of variation of wages by 13 percent. This confirms that investigating the role of work
experience (in particular its differential value across employers) and the determinants of
life-cycle wage growth can improve our understanding of both the cross-sectional and
spatial distributions of wages within a country (Song et al., 2018), of cross-country wage
and income differences (Lagakos et al., 2018), and of the effects of active labor market
programs aimed at enhancing the opportunities and abilities of both unemployed and
less skilled workers (Dustmann and Meghir, 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model.
Section 3 describes our dataset. Section 4 presents summary statistics and key data
patterns. Sections 5 and 6 provide our firm-level and manager-level empirical results.
Section 7 expands on the quantitative implications of our findings for both the cross-
sectional and spatial distributions of wages. Section 8 concludes. Additional details
about the data as well as a number of complementary Tables and Figures are reported in
the Appendix.
2. A Simple Model of Job Mobility with Firm-Specific Experience and
Heterogeneous-Ability Managers
This Section presents a simple model of worker sorting across firms offering different
career development in the spirit of De la Roca et al. (2020). While for simplicity we will
associate better career development with ‘good’ jobs and worse career development with
‘bad’ jobs, we will account for the fact that workers’ career paths also depend on their
observable ability and their unobservable ambition, with the latter blurring the sorting
patterns dictated by the former.
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We consider a continuum of risk-neutral workers with heterogeneous ability denoted
by θ ∈ (0,1). Their career spans two periods, a junior period 1 and a senior period
2. In each period a worker chooses whether to work for one of two types of firms,
labeled B (‘bad’) and G (‘good’). Working for either type of firm has pros and cons.
B-firms offer a less demanding (‘stressful’) environment, but also less rewarding career
development due to fewer chances of gaining and exploiting performance-enhancing
experience. G-firms offer more rewarding career development, but also a more stressful
environment.
In the junior period, a worker faces a continuum of tasks. She succeeds in completing
some of them and fails in completing others. The share of completed tasks is determined
by her ability denoted by θ ∈ (0,1). Each completed tasks gives her a remuneration
w1 > 0 in the junior period as well as valuable experience that she can use to enhance
her performance in the senior period. How much valuable experience the worker gains
depends on the type of junior period employer. Using eB and eG to denote experience
gained at a B-firm and a G-firm respectively, we capture the fact that the former offers
fewer chances of gaining valuable experience by assuming 0 < eB < eG < 1. In her
senior period, the worker has opportunities to exploit her previous experience to tackle
more complex additional tasks based on the tasks she previously completed in the junior
period. The probability that such opportunities arise depend on the type of senior period
employer. Using oB and oG to denote the probability that opportunities arise in a B-
firm and a G-firm respectively, we capture the fact that the former firm offers fewer
chances of exploiting performance-enhancing experience by assuming 0 < oB < oG < 1.
When faced with a more complex task in the senior period, the probability of completing
it is determined by experience, eB or eG, acquired by completing the corresponding
simple task in the junior period. For each complex task completed the worker earns an
additional remuneration w2 > 0 as senior. In both periods, the worker faces a stress cost
that depends on the type of employer. Using sB and sG to denote the cost associated
with a B-firm and a G-firm respectively, we capture the fact that the former offers a
less stressful environment by assuming 0 < sB < sG. Hence, G-firms have an ‘absolute
advantage’ in terms of offering and exploiting experience while F -firm have an ‘absolute
advantage’ in terms of offering a less stressful environment.
The tradeoff between stress and career development depends on the worker’s ability,
but also on her ambition. We define ambition as the willingness to go the extra mile
to complete more complex tasks as senior rather than settling for the ones already
completed as junior. We model ambition as a binary random variable such that all
workers are willing to go the extra mile (‘ambitious’) with probability λ ∈ (0,1) and not
willing to do so (‘unambitious’) with probability 1− λ. This random variable is realized
at the end of the junior period and is meant to capture (time-varying) life circumstances
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that may affect the relevance of career development as a priority with respect to other
(un-modelled) considerations like family and recreation. Randomness implies that the
sorting of workers with different ability across alternative career paths can only be partial
as workers of the same ability may end up choosing different paths as long as they turn
out to have a different ambition.
Based on these assumptions, the net career payoff that a junior worker of ability θ
expects to obtain from working in a f -firm in her junior period and in a h-firm in her
senior period is
Ufh(θ) = −sf + θw1 + (1− λ) (−sh + θw1) + λ (−sh + θw1 + efohθw2) . (1)
By working for a f -firm with f ∈ {B,G} as junior, the worker incurs a stress cost sf
and completes a share θ of tasks with remuneration w1 for each task completed. By
working for a h-firm with h ∈ {B,G} as senior, she incurs a stress cost sh and earns
remuneration w1 for each simple tasks she completes again. If she is unambitious, this
is all she earns. If she is ambitious, she faces with probability oh the opportunity to
perform an additional complex task for each of the θ simple tasks she completes. She
succeeds in each of these complex tasks with probability equal to experience ef acquired
as junior in the f -firm. Senior success in each complex task gives her an additional
remuneration w2. An important feature of net payoff (1) is that, while the cons of working
for G-firm rather than a B-firm depend on neither ability nor ambition, the pros are
amplified by both ability and ambition in the senior period. The return on experience
efohθw2 for f ∈ {B,G} is higher for more able workers in both B- and G-firms, but
disproportionately so in G-firms.
The career path of a worker of ability θ maximizing net payoff (1) can be characterized
working backwards from the senior to the junior period. To avoid a useless proliferation
of subcases, we focus on parameter configurations that allow the model to predict all
career paths: BB, BG, GB and GG. When the worker makes her senior decision, her
ambition has already been realized. If unambitious, the worker will always choose to
work for a B-firm as, without the willingness to go the extra mile, both type of firms offer
the same expected remuneration θw1 but B-firms are less stressful (sB < sG). Otherwise,
if ambitious, she will work for a given firm type if and only if that type offers higher
return. This is determined not only by the worker’s experience but also by its employer’s
type when junior. If the junior employer was a G-firm, the worker chooses a G-firm as
senior employer for θ ≥ θSGGGB with
θSGGGB ≡
sG − sB
w2eG (oG − oB)
.
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If the junior employer was a B-firm, the worker chooses a G-firm as senior employer for
θ ≥ θSBGBB with
θSBGBB ≡
sG − sB
w2eB (oG − oB)
,
where we have θSBGBB > θ
S
GGGB as higher ability is needed to justify employment for
a G-firm with less experience (eB < eG).
Turning to the worker’s decision in the junior period, two cases arise depending on
whether the advantage of working for G-firms is stronger in terms of opportunities as
senior (eBoG − eGoB > 0) or experience as junior (eGoB − eBoG > 0), in other words
whether G-firms have a ‘comparative advantage’ in opportunities or experience. In the
former case, path GB can be ruled out as UGB(θ) is always smaller than UBG(θ), while
path BG is selected whenever UBG(θ) > UBB(θ) and UBG(θ) > UGG(θ) jointly hold. This
happens for θJBGBB ≤ θ < θJGGBG with
θJBGBB ≡
sG − sB
w2eB (oG − oB)
and θJGGBG ≡
sG − sB
λw2oG (eG − eB)
(2)
as long as G-firms’ comparative advantage in opportunities is large enough.3 Otherwise,
paths BB and GG will be selected for θ < θJBGBB and θ ≥ θJBGBB respectively. These
junior choices based on θ are confirmed in the senior period if the worker turns out to




BGBB . If as junior she chose a G-firm
(B-firm) for her senior period given θ ≥ θJBGBB (θ < θJBGBB), then she must still be
happy with that as senior given θSBGBB = θ
J
BGBB . However, if the worker turns out
to be unambitious, in the senior period her junior choices BG and GG are overturned
to BB and GB respectively as, without the willingness to go the extra mile, the best
senior employer is a B-firm irrespective of ability. By contrast, when G-firms have a
comparative advantage in experience (eGoB − eBoG > 0), path GB cannot be ruled out as
the comparison between UGB(θ) and UBG(θ) depends on the probability of willing to go





w2 (eGoB − eBoG)
. (3)
This condition must be met for the model to generate all career paths when G-firms have
a comparative advantage in experience. If it were not met, the worker would prefer BG
to GB, but GB would always be dominated by either BB or GG: with a comparative
advantage in experience rather than opportunities we cannot have θJBGBB < θ
J
GGBG.
Differently, when (3) holds, the worker prefers GB to BG, and she prefers GB also to


















. To allow the model to predict all
career paths when G-firms have a comparative advantage in opportunities, we assume that this condition
holds. If this were not the case, path BG would always be dominated by either BB or GG.
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BB and GG for θJGBBB < θ ≤ θJGGGB with
θJGBBB ≡
sG − sB
λw2oB (eG − eB)
and θJGGGB ≡
sG − sB
w2eG (oG − oB)
as long as G-firms’ comparative advantage in experience is large enough.4 Otherwise,
paths BB and GG will be selected for θ < θJGBBB and θ ≥ θJGGGB respectively. These
junior choices based on θ are confirmed in the senior period if the worker turns out to




GGGB . If as junior she chose a G-firm
(B-firm) for her senior period given θ ≥ θJGGGB (θ < θJGGGB), then she must still be
happy with that as senior given θSGGGB = θ
J
GGGB . However, if the worker turns out to
be unambitious, her junior choice GG is changed to GB in the senior period: without the
willingness to go the extra mile, the best senior employer is again a B-firm irrespective
of ability.
To summarize, we have proposed a sorting model with uncertainty based on the
premise that the return to experience is higher for more able workers irrespective of
the type of firm and disproportionately so in firms offering better career development.
The model is consistent with several career paths. More specifically, it predicts that low
ability workers work for B-firms both in their junior and senior periods. At the same
time, high ability workers work for G-firms both in their junior and senior periods, unless
they turn out to be unambitious, in which case they prefer a B-firm as senior employer.
Intermediate ability workers work for B-firms in the junior period and G-firms in their
senior period if the advantage of working for G-firms is stronger in terms of opportunities
as senior than experience as junior. Yet, some of them end up in B-firms also as senior
if they turn out to be unambitious. Alternatively, intermediate ability workers work
for G-firms in the junior period and B-firms in their senior period if the advantage of
working for G-firms is stronger in terms of experience as junior than opportunities as
senior.
We will later show that both the premise and the predictions of the model find strong
support in our data. In doing so, it will be crucial to account for the fact that experience
and opportunities may be more relevant for some tasks than for others. We will therefore
distinguish between managers and blue-collar workers. It will also be crucial to give
empirical substance to the notion of B-firms and G-firms. In this respect, we will show
that international activity turns out to the a more powerful dividing line than other
natural candidates such as firms’ size and hierarchical structure.


















. To allow the model to predict all career
paths when G-firms have a comparative advantage in experience, we assume that this condition holds. If
this were not the case, path GB would always be dominated by either BB or GG.
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3. Data Description
Our data set is built from two data sources: a matched employer-employee data set,
and an international trade transaction-level data set. Overall, our data provides informa-
tion on firms’ characteristics—including their export and import activities and the de-
gree of foreign-ownership—and workers’ characteristics for the Portuguese economy—
excluding public administration and defence, extra-territorial organizations and bodies,
and some business and professional associations—for the years 1991-2006.5 Employer-
employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a data set made available
by the Ministry of Employment of Portugal, drawing on a compulsory annual census of
all firms in Portugal that employ at least one worker.6 Currently, the data set collects
data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees in each year. Reported data cover
the firm itself, each of its plants, and each of its workers. Each firm and each worker
entering the database are assigned a unique time-invariant identifying number,7 which
we use to follow firms and workers over time. Variables available in the data set include
the firm’s location, industry, date of creation, total employment, share capital, share of
foreign-owned share capital, and sales. The worker-level data cover information on all
personnel working for the reporting firms in a reference week in October of each year.
Data include information on date of birth, date of hiring, education, occupation, earnings,
and hours worked (normal and overtime). The information on earnings includes the basic
remuneration, overtime remuneration, regular bonuses and allowances, and irregular
bonuses and allowances. It does not include employers’ contributions to social security.
The second data set includes all export and import transactions by firms that are
located in Portugal, collected by Statistics Portugal on a monthly basis. These data
include the value and quantity of internationally traded goods (i) between Portugal and
other Member States of the EU (intra-EU trade) and (ii) by Portugal with non-EU coun-
tries (extra-EU trade). Data on extra-EU trade are collected from customs declarations,
5We could have further considered data after 2006 at the cost of including the financial crisis period into
the analysis. Ultimately, we decided to focus on a shorter but cleaner sample period.
6Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been used by,
amongst others, Blanchard and Portugal (2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in terms
of unemployment duration and worker flows, Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the firm
size distribution, and Mion and Opromolla (2014) to show that the export experience acquired by managers
in previous firms leads their current firm towards higher export performance and commands a sizeable
wage premium for the manager.
7The Ministry of Employment implements several checks to ensure that a firm that has already reported
to the database is not assigned a different identification number. Similarly, each worker also has a
unique identifier, based on a worker’s social security number. The administrative nature of the data
and their public availability at the workplace—as required by the law—imply a high degree of coverage
and reliability. It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to less measurement
error than worker-reported data. The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services of
the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance of firms with the law.
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while data on intra-EU trade are collected through the Intrastat system, which, in 1993,
replaced customs declarations as the source of trade statistics within the EU.8 The same
information is used for official statistics and, besides small adjustments, the merchandise
trade transactions in our dataset aggregate to the official total exports and imports of
Portugal. Each transaction record includes, among other information, the firm’s tax
identifier, an eight-digit Combined Nomenclature product code, the destination/origin
country, the value of the transaction in euros, the quantity of transacted goods, and the
relevant international commercial term. We use data on export and import transactions,
aggregated at the firm-year level. These data, together with information on ownership,
allows us to identify whether a firm is internationally active in year t, i.e., whether the
firm exports and/or imports and/or is foreign owned in a given year.
In Appendix A we describe in detail how we construct the sample that combines the
matched employer-employee and international trade data. We consider in the analysis
only single-job, full-time workers between 16 and 65 years old, working between 25 and
80 hours (base plus overtime) per week, and based in continental Portugal. For each
worker in each year, we construct two measures of the hourly wage. The baseline mea-
sure is defined as the (log of the) sum of the basic remuneration, overtime remuneration,
regular bonuses and allowances, and irregular bonuses and allowances, divided by the
sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. A second measure abstracts
from performance-pay components: overtime and irregular bonuses and allowances.
The workers and firms sample so constructed, to which we refer to as the ‘large
sample’, covers the bulk of the Portuguese economy (92% of overall revenue and 88%
of overall employment in 2006) and is the one we use to derive Facts 1 and 2 below
as well as some other specific results. In most of our analysis we instead focus on a
restricted sample, to which we refer to as the ‘young managers sample’, comprising
managers born in 1973 or later, i.e., that were at most 18 in our starting data year 1991,
and their employing firms. The reason for this restriction is twofold. First, both our
model and empirical analysis suggest that managers play a special role in the relationship
between firm growth and wage growth. Second, focusing on young managers allows us
to observe their full employment history and so reconstruct a comprehensive measure of
past employment experience. Moreover, as in Dustmann and Meghir (2005), we focus on
an age group where most of job mobility and lifecycle wage growth takes place.
8Statistics on trade between the Member States of the European Union are based on a European
Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 638/2004 of 31 March 2004 and on the implementing Com-
mission Regulation (EC) No 1982/2004 of 18 November 2004 which lay down or supplement the rules
on methodology, thresholds and specific movements and one amending Commission regulation ((EC) No
1915/2005 on simplified quantity reporting). The Community’s basic customs legislation is contained
in the Customs Code (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92) and the Code’s implementing provisions
(Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93).
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In order to identify managers, we follow Caliendo et al. (2015) and Caliendo et al.
(2020) and consider 4 types of occupations, using the hierarchical variable ‘qualificação’
available in the QP, corresponding to top management (category 3), middle management
and team supervisors (category 2), highly-skilled and skilled professionals (category 1),
and semi-skilled professionals to apprentices (category 0). We define a manager as a
salary-receiving worker employed in occupations 3 or 2 at time t. Clearly a manager at
time t could have been employed in the past in lower categories (1 or 0) although this is
actually quite unfrequent in the data.
The young managers sample comprises 77,174 managers in between 18 and 33 years
old and 26,431 employing firms. In some regressions we instead focus on a different
restricted sample, to which we refer to as the ‘young blue-collars sample’, comprising
blue-collars9 born in 1973 or later and their employing firms. The young blue-collars
sample comprises 180,468 blue-collars in between 18 and 33 years old and 53,552 em-
ploying firms.
4. Data Features
4.1 Two Key Facts
We report here evidence of two strong patterns in the data, that we label Facts 1 and 2,
that are in line with some premises of our model, namely that internationally active firms
(‘good firms’) offer a more rewarding career development and more chances of exploiting
performance-enhancing experience, materializing in the data as steeper experience-wage
profiles for managers and higher rates of sales growth for firms. Facts 1 and 2 are
new with respect to the stylized facts provided by the applied trade literature. More
specifically, the empirical trade literature (Bernard et al., 2012) provides very consistent
evidence that firms involved in international trade are larger and pay higher wages. Facts
1 and 2 below instead draw a link between the internationally active status of a firm and
the growth of sales and wages.
Figure 1 provides evidence obtained from the large sample of Fact 1: Sales growth
in internationally active firms is higher than in domestic firms. More specifically, Figure 1
shows the distribution of the growth rate of sales for internationally active and domestic
firms in the large sample obtained while controlling for firm size, age, location, industry,
and year effects. Figure 1 clearly highlights an overall higher growth performance of
internationally active firms with the difference between mean growth rates standing at
9We define a blue-collar as a salary-receiving worker employed in occupation 0 at time t
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Figure 1: Growth Rate of Sales, Domestic vs. Internationally active Firms, Large Sample
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the growth rate of sales for internationally active and domestic firms in the large sample
obtained while controlling for firm size, age, location, industry, and year effects. More specifically, we regress the growth rate of
sales, computed as the difference in sales between t and t+ 1 divided by the average sales in t and t+ 1, on the log of firm size
(sales) in t, the log of the age of the firm in t, a set of year, region (NUTS III) and industry (1-digit NACE) dummies. Then we take
the residuals, drop observations below (above) the bottom (top) 1 percent, and use them to construct the densities plotted in the figure.
6.9%. Figure C-1 in Appendix C provides additional evidence of Fact 1 related to the
young managers sample.
Figure 2 provides evidence obtained from the large sample of Fact 2: Wage growth
in internationally active firms is, particularly for managers, higher than in domestic firms.
More specifically, Figure 2 shows experience-wage profiles for managers (left panel)
and blue-collar workers (right panel) of domestic and internationally active firms in the
large sample. Such wage profiles are computed as the average residual hourly wage by
number of years of experience (up to 10) obtained after controlling for year, industry and
region effects, and are expressed as a percentage increase relative to the case of one year
of experience. Figures C-2 and C-3 in Appendix C further confirm this finding while
providing a breakdown into manufacturing and services firms. At the same time, Figure
C-4 in Appendix C provides additional evidence of Fact 2 related to the young managers
sample.
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Figure 2: Experience-Wage Profiles in Domestic vs. Internationally active Firms, Managers and
Blue-collar Workers, Large Sample
Notes: This figure shows experience-wage profiles for managers (left panel) and blue-collar workers (right panel) of domestic and
internationally active firms in the large sample. To compute the experience-wage profiles, we first regress hourly wages against a full
set of year, region (NUTS III) and industry (1-digit NACE) dummies. We then compute, for each type of firm, the average residual
hourly wage by number of years of experience (up to 10). Finally, we compute the percentage wage increase relative to the case of
one year of experience. The blue and green bands represent confidence intervals at the 95% level.
4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 below provides some descriptive statistics, of both key manager-level and firm-
level variables, related to the young managers sample and referring to the year 2006. The
top panel of Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, min and max of some key
manager-level variables as well as the number of observations. The (log) hourly wage is
defined as the (log of the) sum of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours
of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of
the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Tenure instead refers to the number
of years the manager has been working for the current employer while job mobility
indicates the number of times (plus one) the manager has changed employer up to year t.
We then construct the standard measure of work experience used in the literature—years
of potential experience, that is, years elapsed since finishing school—and identify the
subset of years in which the manager has worked for internationally active firms: we call
the latter international experience and we define domestic experience as the complement
to potential experience. Table 1 indicates, among other, that the mean tenure for young
managers is below 4 years while the number of job changes varies between 0 and 8 with
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an average of 0.6. At the same time, domestic and international experience vary between
0 and 15 years with an average of 6.37 years for the former and 2.51 years for the latter.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Young Managers
Sample, Year 2006
Key Manager-level Variables
N. observ. Mean St.dev. Min Max
Log Hourly Wage 77,174 0.45 0.52 -1.64 2.29
Tenure 77,174 3.69 3.32 0.00 33.00
Job Mobility 77,174 1.60 0.88 1.00 9.00
Domestic Experience 77,174 6.37 3.67 0.00 15.00
International Experience 77,174 2.51 2.95 0.00 15.00
Key Firm-level Variables
N. observ. Mean St.dev. Min Max
Size 26,431 2.59 1.37 0.00 9.64
Productivity 26,431 10.96 1.21 3.22 17.49
Log Firm Age 26,431 2.36 0.93 0.00 5.93
Share Skilled 26,431 0.22 0.28 0.00 1.00
Internationally Active 26,431 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Notes: Data refer to the young managers sample for the year 2006. Con-
cerning manager-level variables, the (log) hourly wage is defined as the (log
of the) sum of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work),
overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum
of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Tenure refers to the
number of years the manager has been working for the current employer
while job mobility indicates the number of times (plus one) the manager has
changed employer up to year t. Domestic experience is number of years the
manager has worked in the past for domestic firms (including the current
firm) while international experience is the number of years a manager has
worked in the past for intentionally active firms (including the current firm).
Moving to firm-level variables, size is firm log employment, productivity is
log apparent labour productivity, the share of skilled workers is the share
of a firm’s workers (managers and non-managers) with 12 or more years of
education, log firm age is the log of the age of the firm and internationally
active is a dummy taking value one if the firm is involved in exporting and/or
importing and/or is foreign owned and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for
more details.
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports the mean, standard deviation, min and max of
some key firm-level variables as well as the number of observations. More specifically,
size is firm log employment, productivity is log apparent labour productivity, the share of
skilled workers is the share of a firm’s workers (managers and non-managers) with 12 or
more years of education, log firm age is the log of the age of the firm and internationally
active is a dummy taking value one if the firm is involved in exporting and/or importing
and/or is foreign owned and zero otherwise. In this respect, Table 1 indicates that 30%
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of firms are internationally active and so the remaining 70% are domestic. Appendix A
provides more details on the construction of both manager-level and firm-level variables
while Table C-1 in Appendix C provides the equivalent of Table 1 for the young blue-
collars sample.
In order to get insights into what type of firms young managers end up working for,
Table 2 describes the distribution of firms in the large sample for the year 2006 between
firms with no managers and firms with managers; where the latter is further split into
firms employing no manager belonging to the young managers sample (‘No Young
Manager’) and firms employing at least one manager belonging to the young managers
sample (‘Some Young Managers’). Table 2 shows that, as in Mion and Opromolla (2014),
most firms do not employ a manager. Yet firms employing at least one manager account
for the bulk of aggregate employment and revenue (70% of employment and 84% of
revenue). At the same time, firms belonging to the smaller sample of firms employing
young managers (representing 46% of aggregate employment and 69% of aggregate
revenue) are present in all sectors of the economy albeit in somewhat different shares
with respect to firms not employing any young manager.
Table 2: Firms, Managers and Young Managers, Year 2006
Firms with Manager No Manager Overall Share Overall Number
Industry No Young Manager Some Young Managers
Agriculture 11.23 6.51 82.26 100.00 8,416
Fishing 29.36 11.01 59.63 100.00 109
Mining and Quarrying 27.77 14.95 57.28 100.00 749
Manufacturing 20.18 13.22 66.60 100.00 38,276
Electricity 19.61 55.56 24.84 100.00 153
Construction 18.34 10.64 71.01 100.00 33,882
Wholesale and Retail 16.67 9.74 73.59 100.00 73,780
Hotels and Restaurant 11.77 5.44 82.79 100.00 27,230
Transport and Communication 13.87 7.04 79.09 100.00 9,873
Financial Intermediation 20.24 19.91 59.85 100.00 1,823
Real Estate and Busin. 19.62 24.96 55.42 100.00 25,008
Public Adm., Education 13.59 25.03 61.38 100.00 14,080
Other 7.88 5.96 86.16 100.00 10,016
Total 16.44 12.13 71.44 100.00 243,395
Notes: Data refer to the large sample for the year 2006. The Table reports the distribution of firms between firms with no managers and
firms with managers; where the latter is further split into firms employing no manager belonging to the young managers sample (‘No
Young Manager’) and firms employing at least one manager belonging to the young managers sample (‘Some Young Managers’).
Table 3 further shows for the 38,276 firms belonging to manufacturing, where numbers
are more comparable across firms, average sales, employment and age as well as the share
of internationally active firms broken down by firms with no managers and firms with
managers; where the latter is further split into firms employing no manager belonging
to the young managers sample (‘No Young Manager’), firms whose managers all belong
to the young managers sample (‘All Young Managers’) and firms in between the two
(‘Some But Not All Young Managers’). Table 3 shows that young managers can be
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found in relatively small and young firms comprising young managers only (that are
overall comparable to firms with managers but no young managers), as well as in larger,
older and more internationally active firms comprising both young managers and older
managers.
Table 3: Firms, Managers and Young Managers, Year 2006, Manufactur-
ing
Firms with Manag. No Manag.
No All Some But Not All
Young Manager Young Managers Young Managers
Mean Sales 1,465,513 1,061,900 15,547,379 330,290
Mean Employment 22.37 16.41 93.26 6.90
Mean Age 18.45 12.43 23.05 13.77
Mean Int Act Status 0.38 0.35 0.76 0.11
Notes: Data refer to manufacturing firms in the large sample for the year 2006. The Table reports
average sales (in euros), employment (number of workers) and age as well as the share of inter-
nationally active firms broken down by firms with no managers and firms with managers; where
the latter is further split into firms employing no manager belonging to the young managers sample
(‘No Young Manager’), firms whose managers all belong to the young managers sample (‘All Young
Manager’) and firms in between the two (‘Some But Not All Young Managers’).
5. Firm Growth and Managers’ International Experience
It is a well established fact that firms involved in international trade are characterized
by ‘level premia’ and in particular are larger and more productive (Bernard et al., 2012).
At the same time, Fact 1 reported in Section 4 provides fresh evidence about growth
being also higher in internationally active firms. In this Section, we further show that
firms grow more if employing managers with more experience and in particular more
international experience. This is consistent with internationally active firms being charac-
terized by stronger growth opportunities, that are best realized by more able/experienced
managers, as suggested by our simple model.
Table 4 provides results for the large sample. The dependent variable is the growth
rate of sales, computed as the difference in sales between t and t + 1 divided by the
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average sales in t and t+ 1,10 while the two key controls are firm size (log sales) in t and
(the log of) firm age in t. In all regressions we include year, industry and region dummies
while clustering standard errors at the firm-level. In this respect, the literature on firm’s
growth and the firm size distribution (Luttmer, 2007) highlights the importance of firm
age and size suggesting a negative sign in both cases. We confirm this for our data in
column (1) of Table 4.11 More specifically, both coefficients are around -0.05 indicating
that, doubling size or age, decreases growth by about 5 percentage points. In column
(2) we then add a dummy for internationally active firms and find these firms to grow
substantially more (about 9%) than domestic firms.
Table 4: Growth Regressions, Large Sample
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Baseline Inter. Active
Firm Sales (log) -0.0427a -0.0504a
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Firm Age (log) -0.0535a -0.0540a
(0.0004) (0.0004)




Year Region Industry Dummies X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of sales,
computed as the difference in sales between t and t+ 1 divided
by the average sales in t and t+ 1. Column (1) is the baseline
specification controlling for firm (log) sales and age in t. Col-
umn (2) introduces a dummy variable equal to 1 when the firm
is internationally active. All specifications include year, indus-
try (1-digit NACE), and region (NUTS III) dummies. Standard
errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the firm level. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1
10This growth rate measure is routinely used in the ‘gross job creation - gross job destruction’ literature
to measure establishment-level employment changes (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). It is also sometimes
used in the international trade literature to decompose aggregate exports growth into the contribution
of continuing firms, entrants, and exiters (Eaton et al., 2008). The growth rate measure is (i) symmetric
around zero; (ii) it lies in the interval [−2,2]; (iii) it is monotonically related to the conventional growth rate
measure; (iv) it is approximately equal to the conventional growth rate measure for small growth rates.
The benefit of computing the growth rate in this way is that (i) an x percent growth followed by a −x
percent growth brings back to the same level; (ii) sales values close to zero in the first year have a less
extreme effect on the growth rate.
11This regression is the one used to construct Figure 1.
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In Table 5 we instead focus on firms belonging to the young managers sample.
Columns (1) to (3) provide OLS estimation results including year, industry and region
dummies while column (4) provides within estimation results including year dummies
and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Column (1)
confirms for this sample that firm size and age are negatively related to firm growth,12
while column (2) confirms that internationally active firms grow more than domestic
firms. Columns (3) and (4) further indicate that growth is increasing in the total number
of years of experience of the young managers employed by the firm (Total Experience)
as well as in the share of this total experience gained in internationally active firms
(Ratio International Experience). In particular, coefficients indicate that doubling total
experience increases the growth rate by about 2 percentage points while the growth rate
is about 3 percentage points higher if the share of total experience corresponding to
international experience is one as opposed to zero.
These results are in line with the features of our simple model, and in particular sug-
gest that internationally active firms are characterized by stronger growth opportunities
that are best realized by more experienced/able managers, while at the same time under-
lying the importance of the distinction between domestic and international experience. In
order to provide more compelling evidence of the relationship between firm growth and
wage growth working through experience, and in particular international experience, as
well as of other features of our model, in the next Section we consider manager-level
regressions using wage as the dependent variable. This allows us to employ more
controls and fixed effects as well as to draw on a more exogenous source of variation
in the data (firm closures and related job displacement).
6. Experience-Wage Profiles of Managers and Blue-Collars Workers
It is a well established fact that firms involved in international trade are characterized
by a higher level of wages (Bernard et al., 2012), and this is robust to controlling for
sorting of better workers into such firms (Mion and Opromolla, 2014). However, such
higher level of wages might materialize in the data in two different ways: 1) because
of wage jumps occurring when moving from a domestic to an internationally active
firm (better opportunities in our model) and/or 2) because of a higher wage growth in
internationally active as opposed to domestic firms (higher accumulation of performance-
enhancing experience in our model). In this light, Fact 2 reported in Section 4 points to
12This regression is the one used to construct Figure C-1 in Appendix C.
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Table 5: Growth Regressions, Young Managers Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Baseline Int. Active Int. Experience Int. Experience FE
Firm Sales (log) -0.0205a -0.0248a -0.0303a -0.3698a
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0141)
Firm Age (log) -0.0492a -0.0496a -0.0482a -0.0406a
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0107)
Int. Act. (0/1) 0.0411a 0.0296a 0.0055
(0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0082)
Total Experience (log) 0.0225a 0.0220a
(0.0017) (0.0036)
Ratio Int. Exp. (ratio) 0.0262a 0.0315b
(0.0076) (0.0159)
Observations 60,171 60,171 60,171 60,171
R-squared 0.0537 0.0558 0.0588 0.2661
Year Region Industry Dummies X X X
Firm FE X
Year Dummies X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS Within
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of sales, computed as the difference in sales between
t and t + 1 divided by the average sales in t and t + 1. Column (1) is the baseline specification
controlling for firm (log) sales and age in t. Column (2) adds a dummy variable equal to 1 when
the firm is internationally active. Column (3) further introduces the (log) total number of years of
experience of the young managers employed by the firm as well as the share of this total experience
gained in internationally active firms. Column (4) further adds firm fixed effects. All specifications,
except column (4) where we consider only year dummies, include year, industry (1-digit NACE), and
region (NUTS III) dummies. Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the firm level. a p<0.01, b
p<0.05, c p<0.1
the importance of the second channel by providing strong evidence that wage growth is
higher in internationally active firms.
In this Section, we tackle the issues of opportunities, experience, ability and portability
more directly by estimating a number of manager-level wage regressions while employ-
ing several controls and fixed effects as well as drawing on a more exogenous source of
variation in the data: firm closures and related job displacement. Our results suggest that
managers employed by internationally active firms have higher wages because of a higher
wage growth rather than because of wage jumps. At the same time, the portion of the
wage related to the higher wage growth enjoyed in internationally active firms sticks with
the manager when moving to other firms so lending support to the idea that it measures
something that is valuable/portable to/across all firms. We also provide evidence that
the returns on domestic and international experience are both higher for better managers
while at the same time the difference between the two returns stacks up to a 11-20% wage
gap after 10 years. Our results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and
robustness tests. In order to single out the specificities of managers we further analyze
blue-collar workers and show that, contrary to managers, they earn higher wages in
internationally active firms only because of wage jumps so suggesting that experience
and learning play a modest role for these workers. Finally, our analysis indicates that
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the distinction between internationally active and domestic firms is more powerful in
capturing the dynamics of managers’ wages than the distinction between large and small
firms or the distinction between firms with many or few layers of management.
In what follows we use matched employer-employee data for Portugal (QP) and
consider the time span 1991-2006 while de-trending (log) hourly wages, before any
regressions, using industry-year pair dummies on the full set of workers in order to
avoid potential compositional effects when comparing the return on different types of
experience.
Each manager i is associated at time t to a unique current employing firm f . The key
variables in our analysis are: (i) a dummy variable (Int.Actft) indicating whether a firm
is internationally active in t (the firm exports and/or imports and/or is foreign owned)
or not; (ii) the number of years (Int.EXPit) a manager has worked in the past for inten-
tionally active firms (including the current firm); (iii) the number of years (Dom.EXPit)
a manager has worked in the past for domestic firms (including the current firm). We
also sometimes use overall experience (Over.EXPit=Int.EXPit+Dom.EXPit).13
The starting wage equation we estimate (that we label OLS) is:
wit = β0 + β1Int.Act.ft + β2Over.EXPit + I′itΓI + C
′
ftΓC + ηr + εit, (4)
where wit is the de-trended (log) hourly wage of manager i in year t, Int. Actft is
the dummy indicating whether the employing firm f is internationally active in t or
not, Over. EXPit is a manager’s overall experience (domestic and international), and
the vector Iit stands for manager i other time-varying observables: number of years of
education, tenure in the firm and its square.14 The vector Cft refers to current employing
firm observables: size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity),
share of skilled workers,15 and log firm age. Finally, ηr denotes firm location dummies
(NUTS3 regions).
Equation (4) is our starting point and it serves the purpose of confirming whether
the stylized fact that internationally active firms pay more holds in our data. More
specifically, the dummy Int.Act.ft captures any cross-sectional differences in the wages
13All results in this Section refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe
implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010) methodology to deal with the various fixed effects we
consider. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the
estimation procedure while standard errors are clustered at the manager-level.
14More specifically, since changes over time in the number of years of schooling are likely to mainly pick
up measurement error rather than a genuine change in the number of years of education, we consider
the mode of the distribution of the number of years of education for each manager. Therefore, number of
years of education is a time-invariant variable in our analysis and will not be identified any more when
considering manager fixed effects.
15Share of a firm’s workers (managers and non-managers) with 12 or more years of education.
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of domestic and internationally active firms and corresponds to standard practice in the
literature (Bernard et al., 1995, Frías et al., 2012).
6.1 Fixed Effects Specifications
Ability, International and Domestic Experience, Portability, and Job Mobility We
enrich (4) by adding manager fixed effects ηi, i.e., heterogeneity in ability across
managers as in the model described in Section 2, as well as by introducing the
distinction between domestic and international experience, i.e., variables capturing the
differential impact on wage growth related to working one more year for a domestic or an
internationally active firm, while also assessing whether these two types of experience
are fully portable across firms as suggested by our model. We do this progressively by
means of equations (5) to (7):
wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + I′itΓI + C
′
ftΓC + ηi + εit, (5)
wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + β2Dom.EXPit + β3Int.EXPit + I′itΓI + C
′
ftΓC + ηi + εit, (6)
wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + β2Dom.EXPit + β3Int.EXPit + β4Dom.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft
+ β5Int.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft + I′itΓI + C′ftΓC + ηi + εit, (7)
where we drop location dummies, because their identification would rest on a small and
noisy variation, and the reference category for interactions in equation (7) is represented
by domestic firms, i.e., β2 (β3) in (7) is the value of a manager’s domestic (international)
experience when working for a domestic firm while β2 + β4 (β3 + β5) is the value of
a manager’s domestic (international) experience when working for an internationally
active firm. Crucially, if β4 and β5 are zero and/or small compared to β2 and β3, which
is what we consistently find across a range of specifications, it means that both domestic
and international experience represent a wage component that is fully portable across
firms. Furthermore, β1 is now identified by: (i) managers remaining in the same firm
with the employing firm changing internationally active status; (ii) managers moving
from domestic to internationally active firms and vice-versa. Therefore, such parameter
now better corresponds to those wage jumps related to differences in opportunities in
our model. We refer to equation (5) as ‘FE’, to equation (6) as ‘Type of experience’ and to
equation (7) as ‘Portability’.
In order to better control for firm heterogeneity and single out wage patterns related
to job mobility we further consider the following enrichment of (7):
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wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + β2Dom.EXPit + β3Int.EXPit + β4Dom.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft
+ β5Int.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft + β6Job.Mobilit + β7Job.Mobilit ∗ Int.Actft + I′itΓI
+ C′ftΓC + ηi + ηf + εit, (8)
where ηf are firm fixed effects while Job. Mobilit is a job mobility dummy that we
consider both alone as well as interacted with the internationally active status of the
employing firm in t. More specifically, the way we constructed Job.Mobilit is such that
each time a manager changes firm the dummy jumps up by an additional unit and so it
broadly captures wage jumps occurring when managers move from one firm to another.16
The additional interaction of Job.Mobilit with Int.Actft further controls for differential
wage jumps occurring whenever the new employing firm is internationally active. We
label equation (8) ‘Mobility & Firm FE’.
Selection on Unobservables and Heterogeneous Returns on Experience We then
consider more complex specifications aiming at better controlling for selection on
unobservables as well as understanding whether and how returns on domestic and
international experience are heterogeneous across managers. The first specification we
consider, that we label ‘Job-Spell FE’, is:
wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + β2Dom.EXPit + β3Int.EXPit + β4Dom.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft
+ β5Int.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft + β6Job.Mobilit + β7Job.Mobilit ∗ Int.Actft + I′itΓI
+ C′ftΓC + ηif + εit, (9)
where rather than having separate firm and manager fixed effects as in (8), we allow
for job-spell fixed effects ηif . Such specification thus allows to control for a wide range
of potentially correlated unobservables (like distance) by having a match-specific fixed
effect (Dustmann and Pereira, 2008).17 However, it also reduces the amount of variation
16Given the presence of manager fixed effects, the dummy Job. Mobilit is indeed identified only by
managers changing firms. For example, when considering (8) in first differences, the left hand side variable
would be the wage change wit − wit−1 with Job. Mobilit − Job. Mobilit−1 being zero if the manager is
employed by the same firm in t− 1 and t and one if the manager moves to a new employing firm in t.
17Bias could arise if distance between the manager and the firm is systematically correlated with
observables and in particular with whether the firm is internationally active or not and with how much
domestic and international experience the manager has. In this respect, the use of job-spell fixed effects
ηif should minimize this issue.
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and observations used for identification while not allowing to disentangle manager from
firm FE.
Another specification we implement, that we label ‘Individual Linear Trends’, allows
for both time-invariant and time-variant correlated unobservables. More specifically,
we enrich (8) with manager-specific linear trends η2i ∗ t that are estimated along with
standard manager fixed effects η1i. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that idiosyncratic
ability, skills and motivation affect wages while being reasonably invariant over time for
a given manager. This is customary translated into manager fixed effects η1i affecting
the level of wages by acting as wage jumps. However, it is possible that ability, skills
and motivation also affect wages’ growth and we model this in a parsimonious way by
means of manager-specific linear trends in wages η2i ∗ t. In particular, we consider the
following model:
wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + β2Dom.EXPit + β3Int.EXPit + β4Dom.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft
+ β5Int.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft + β6Job.Mobilit + β7Job.Mobilit ∗ Int.Actft + I′itΓI
+ C′ftΓC + η1i + η2i ∗ t+ εit, (10)
where we drop, with respect to (8), firm fixed effects because of identification issues.18
Finally, in order to assess whether and how returns on domestic and international
experience are heterogeneous across managers, like suggested by our simple model, we
consider a further enrichment of (8) that we label ‘Heterogeneous Returns on Experience’:
wit = β0 + β1Int.Actft + β2Dom.EXPit + β3Int.EXPit + β4Dom.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft
+ β5Int.EXPit ∗ Int.Actft + β6Job.Mobilit + β7Job.Mobilit ∗ Int.Actft
+ β8Dom.EXPit ∗ ηi + β9Int.EXPit ∗ ηi + I′itΓI + C′ftΓC + ηi + ηf + εit, (11)
where we interact manager fixed effects ηi with both domestic (Dom.EXPit ∗ ηi) and in-
18Operationally, we apply time first-differences to (10) to get rid of standard fixed effects η1i and estimate
the time-differenced model, in which the manager-specific linear trend η2i ∗ t becomes a simple fixed effect
η2i , via OLS with the he Stata user-written routine reghdfe. Once estimated parameters and fixed effects
η2i we then come back to the original model (10) and compute fixed effects η1i. In order to get more reliable
estimates of both η1i and η2i we further restrict the sample to managers with at least four observations.
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ternational (Int.EXPit ∗ ηi) experience.19 More specifically, positive values of interaction
coefficients β8 and β9 would indicate that one more year of domestic and/or international
experience increases more the wage of more skilled/better manager as suggested by our
model. Besides allowing investigating an interesting feature of our model, specification
(11) also provides insights on how well fixed effects capture ability and skills. More
specifically, if fixed effects were to entirely reflect idiosyncratic shocks unrelated to
ability and skills one would expect the two interaction terms not to be significantly
different from zero, i.e., the lack of any specific pattern related to the combined impact
of experience and fixed effects.
Discussion A few remarks are in order at this stage. First, the use of manager fixed
effects purges parameters from time-invariant manager heterogeneity (our measure of
ability) while the identifying variation is now across time for a given manager. Further-
more, if managers did not move across firms and/or firms did not change internationally
active status, there would be little room for separating the impact on wage growth of one
more year of experience from one more year of tenure within the firm. Indeed, in such a
case there would not be in the data any two managers with the same years of tenure but
with, for example, different years of international experience. However, in the data man-
agers do move across firms, and in particular between domestic and internationally active
firms, and firms change internationally active status so that domestic and international
experience can be separately identified from tenure. In this respect, Tables 6 and 7 show
that there is mobility of both low-ability (below average fixed effect) and high-ability
(above average fixed effect) managers to and from internationally active and domestic
firms. Furthermore, in line with the model outlined in Section 2, imperfect sorting is at
work with high-ability managers being more likely than low-ability managers to end up
in an internationally active firm when changing job.
Second, the fact that identification heavily relies on managers moving across firms
raises more prominently the issue of selection, i.e., of the non-random matching between
firms and managers. As discussed in Section 2, it is important to consider both selection
on observables, which does not necessarily raise an issue of estimation bias, and selection
on unobservables which is needed for identification and could be a source of bias that is
19In order to better separate manager and firm fixed effects we focus in estimations of (11) on young
managers belonging to the largest connected group (Abowd et al., 2002). For sample consistency across
specifications, we report in Table C-3 in Appendix C estimation results referring to specifications (4) to (8)
obtained with the sample used for (11). Results are qualitatively, and to a large extent also quantitatively,
identical to those reported in Table 8. Finally, in order to estimate (11), and in particular interaction
coefficients β8 and β9, we build upon the iterative OLS procedure developed in De La Roca and Puga
(2017) to which we refer the reader for further details.
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Table 6: Low-Ability Managers that Change Employing Firm,
Specification Mobility & Firm FE.
Domestic in t Internationally Active in t Total
Domestic in t-1 62.72 37.28 100.00
Internationally active in t-1 35.52 64.48 100.00
Total 49.43 50.57 100.00
Notes: The above Table provides a transition matrix constructed using observed job
changes between t− 1 and t in the young managers sample over the period 1991-2006.
Job changes are split into four different categories depending on whether the employ-
ing firm in t− 1 is domestic or internationally active and on whether the (different)
employing firm in t is domestic or internationally active. For example, the top-left cell
indicates that 62.72% of managers that were employed in a domestic firm in t− 1 and
move to another firm in t actually move to a domestic firm while, for example, the
first cell of the bottom row indicates that 49.43% of managers changing firm between
t− 1 and t end up in t in a domestic firm. The Table refers to low-ability managers,
i.e, managers with fixed effects below the average. Fixed effects refer to the Mobility &
Firm FE specification in column (5) of Table 8.
Table 7: High-Ability Managers that Change Employing Firm,
Specification Mobility & Firm FE.
Domestic in t Internationally active in t Total
Domestic in t-1 54.19 45.81 100.00
Internationally active in t-1 30.80 69.20 100.00
Total 40.89 59.11 100.00
Notes: The above Table provides a transition matrix constructed using observed job
changes between t− 1 and t in the young managers sample over the period 1991-2006.
Job changes are split into four different categories depending on whether the employ-
ing firm in t− 1 is domestic or internationally active and on whether the (different)
employing firm in t is domestic or internationally active. For example, the top-left cell
indicates that 54.19% of managers that were employed in a domestic firm in t− 1 and
move to another firm in t actually move to a domestic firm while, for example, the
first cell of the bottom row indicates that 40.89% of managers changing firm between
t− 1 and t end up in t in a domestic firm. The Table refers to high-ability managers,
i.e, managers with fixed effects above the average. Fixed effects refer to the Mobility
& Firm FE specification in column (5) of Table 8.
minimized by having a large set of observables. As far as observable characteristics of
the manager and the firm are concerned, in our empirical analysis we build upon a large
set of covariates and various fixed effects.
In this respect, Tables 6 and 7 show that, although present, sorting on ability is
imperfect. Furthermore, Figure 3 indicates that there is a substantial overlap in the
support of the distributions of managers’ ability, as measured by manager fixed effects
obtained from (11), as well as managers’ wages when comparing managers who change
job with managers who do not change job.20 More specifically, despite average wages
(fixed effects) are 10.1% (9.7%) higher, and significantly so at the 1% level, for managers
20Figure C-5 in Appendix C provides very similar results related to estimations of equation (8).
26
Figure 3: Wage and Fixed Effects of Movers and Stayers, Specification with Heterogeneous
Returns on Experience
Notes: This figure shows the density of the hourly wage (left panel) and the fixed effects (right panel) for managers belonging to the
young managers sample that change firm at least once (‘movers’) and for managers that always stay in the same firm (‘stayers’). The
sample considered is the one referring to the heterogeneous returns on experience specification in column (3) of Table 9.
who change job there is a substantial common support, as well as a very similar shape,
for both the outcome variable and the fixed effects so suggesting that our regression
framework is capable to account for selection on ability.
Third, our model suggests that firm growth and managers’ wage growth are related
to each other through opportunities and experience with differences across firms and
managers in opportunities and experience being accounted for by the distinction between
internationally active and domestic firms. However, there are other channels linking firm
growth to managers’ wage growth like, for example, general bonus payments related to
firm performance and growth. In order to account for such complementary channels we
do consider in all of our regressions, and in particular in the group of firm-time controls
Cft, firm size as measured by employment as well as firm productivity. In this respect,
with manager fixed effects, the coefficients related to the two controls are essentially
identified by within-firm size and productivity growth21 and so the value of, for example,
one additional year of domestic and international experience is net of the wage change
that can be related to overall within-firm growth in size and productivity.
Results Table 8 reports estimations referring to the main covariates of equations (4) to
(8) while additional details on control variables are reported in Table C-2 in Appendix
21In (8) the coefficients related to firm size and productivity are, due to the additional presence of firm
fixed effects, solely identified by within-firm size and productivity growth.
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Table 8: Wage Regressions, Simple Specifications, Main Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.1216a 0.0314a 0.0216a 0.0409a 0.0020
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0065) (0.0058)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0204a 0.0515a
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0428a∗∗ 0.0429a∗∗ 0.0326a∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0019)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0620a∗∗ 0.0663a∗∗ 0.0509a∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0021)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0024a -0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0008)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0044a -0.0010
(0.0015) (0.0012)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0603a
(0.0051)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0047
(0.0030)
Observations 322,360 254,990 254,990 254,990 249,562
R-squared 0.3059 0.8767 0.8773 0.8774 0.9105
Manager-Year Controls X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X
Region FE X
Manager FE X X X X
Firm FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-
digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of
work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime
hours of work. Regressions are run on the young managers sample. Manager-year controls include number of years of
education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity
(log apparent labour productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the OLS specification. The
FE specification in column (2) includes manager fixed effects. Column (3) distinguishes between experience in domestic and
internationally active firms. Column (4) allows the return on domestic and international experience to be different according
to the international status of the firm. Column (5) features firm fixed effects while introducing a control for job changes both
alone and interacted with the international status of the employing firm in t. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at
the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and international experience are
significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written
routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects.
The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation procedure. For
example, in the case of manager fixed effects in column (2) the number of observations does not include managers for which
only one observation is available. Such managers are instead included in the number of observations in column (1).
C.22 Column (1) of Table 8 refers to estimations of (4) and the key result stemming from
this specification is that internationally active firms pay, conditional on our set of controls,
about 12% higher wages than domestic firms so confirming previous evidence of a
substantial wage premium related to firms involved in international trade (Bernard et al.,
2012). When considering manager fixed effects in column (2) of Table 8, the coefficient of
Int.Actft is still strongly significant but drops considerably to about 3%. In this respect,
column (1) of Table C-4 in Appendix C highlights how this drop is related to the presence
of (imperfect) sorting of better managers into internationally active firms as measured by
the positive correlation between manager fixed effects and the Int.Actft dummy.
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 8 report results of equations (6) to (8). The first thing to
22As far as control variables are concerned, Table C-2 in Appendix C shows that coefficients are in line
with expectations. In particular, we find positive but diminishing returns on tenure, a positive return
on education and sizeable positive premia related to firm productivity and (especially) size as well as to
firm share of skilled workers. Finally, columns (1) to (4) of Table C-4 in Appendix C indicate that imperfect
sorting of better managers into internationally active firms, as measured by the positive correlation between
manager fixed effects and the Int.Actft dummy, is present throughout manager fixed effects specifications.
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highlight is that there is evidence of a significant differential return on domestic and
international experience in all those specification of about 2%, i.e., one additional year
of international experience increases the wage by about 2% more than one additional
year of domestic experience.23 Columns (4) and (5) of Table 8 further indicate, given
the small and not always significant coefficients of the interactions between domestic
and international experience with the Int. Actft dummy, that the wage components
related to both domestic and international experience are equally valued by domestic
and internationally active firms, i.e., both types of experience are fully portable/valued
across/by all firms. In particular, column (5) of Table 8 highlights how this result is
robust to controlling for both firm fixed effects and job mobility patterns. Regarding the
latter, our estimations do suggest that managers enjoy, on average, wage increases when
moving from one job to another raising their wage by about 6%. However, this has little
impact on the differential return between domestic and international experience.
As far as the Int.Actft dummy is concerned, the presence of both firm and manager
fixed effects in column (5) of Table 8 means that the related coefficient is only identified by
firms changing their internationally active status which is arguably a rather slim variation
to exploit. Indeed, the coefficient of Int. Actft is positive, small and not significant
in column (5) of Table 8 while being positive, significant and in between 2% to 4% in
columns (2) to (4) where identification also comes from managers moving between do-
mestic and internationally active firms. However, the key point we want to highlight here
is that wage jumps enjoyed by managers when moving from domestic to internationally
active firms represent at best (4%) two years of additional wage growth (2*2%) enjoyed
when gaining experience in internationally active firms rather than in domestic firms.
Therefore, in the space of a couple of years the main reason why managers are paid
higher wages in internationally active firms is a higher wage growth, that sticks with the
manager when moving to other firms, rather than a wage jump.
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 9 report estimation results for the main covariates of
specifications (9) to (11) while additional details on control variables are reported in
Table C-2 in Appendix C. Looking at columns (1) and (2) reveals that estimates are quite
similar to those of specification (8). In particular, the difference between the returns on
domestic and international experience remains around 2% and strongly significant. At
the same time, when considering columns (1) to (3), the Int.Actft dummy wage jump
remains small while both domestic and international experience appear to be largely
portable across domestic and internationally active firms. This suggests that our results
are not particularly sensitive to the presence of richer forms of correlated unobserved
heterogeneity.
23In Table 8 ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and international experience are significantly
different from each other at the 5% level.
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Table 9: Wage Regressions, More Complex Specifications, Main Covariates
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Job-Spell FE Ind. Linear Trends Heter. Returns on Exper.
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0082 0.0415a 0.0025
(0.0058) (0.0090) (0.0033)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0170a∗∗ 0.0353a∗∗ 0.0383a∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0003)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0363a∗∗ 0.0551a∗∗ 0.0507a∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0040) (0.0006)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0013 -0.0035a -0.0013a
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0004)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0023c -0.0052a 0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0007)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0590a 0.0685a 0.0550a
(0.0117) (0.0067) (0.0004)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0025 0.0081c -0.0049a
(0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0018)
Domestic Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0118a∗∗
(0.0002)
International Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0275a∗∗
(0.0004)
Observations 233,629 104,921 147,367
R-squared 0.9143 0.8719 0.9985
Manager-Year Controls X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X
Manager FE X X
Firm FE X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies
interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the monthly base wage
(gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the
sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Regressions are run on the young managers sample.
Manager-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square.
Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity),
share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the Job-Spell FE specification using firm-
manager FE instead of separate manager and firm FE. The Individual Linear Trends specification in column
(2) includes both standard manager fixed effects as well as the interactions between separate manager fixed
effects and a linear trend. The Heterogeneous Returns on Experience specification in column (3) instead uses
manager and firm FE while adding two interaction terms of manager FE with domestic and international
experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c
p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and international experience (or the coefficients of the
interactions of domestic experience with the manager FE and international experience with the manager FE)
are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with
the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal
with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of
observations used by the estimation procedure.
Column (3) of Table 9 reports estimation results of our preferred specification, i.e.,
(11). The reasons why we consider (11) to be our preferred specification are twofold.
First, the fact that results are very stable across specifications (8) to (10) reassures about
potential bias coming from richer forms of correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Second,
we see specification (11) as a substantial improvement over (8) because interaction term
coefficients β8 and β9 are both strongly significant, and so is their difference,24 and
portrait a quite interesting pattern. Returns on domestic and international experience
are in fact manager-specific in (11) and Figure 4 shows how such returns are related to
manager fixed effects. More specifically, the left panel shows the return on international
experience for a manager in an internationally active firm, and the return on domestic
experience for a manager in a domestic firm, by manager fixed effect. The right panel
instead shows the cumulative distribution of manager fixed effects. Figure 4 indicates
24∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of the interactions of domestic experience with the manager FE and
international experience with the manager FE are significantly different from each other at the 5% level.
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that one more year of international experience is associated to a higher return than one
more year of domestic experience across the whole distribution of manager fixed effects.
Furthermore, in line with our model, one more year of domestic and/or international
experience is more valuable to better/higher fixed effects managers. Moreover, the
difference between the two returns grows with the manager fixed effects, i.e., it is small
for managers with low fixed effects and becomes much bigger for higher fixed effects
managers.
Figure 4: Returns on International and Domestic Experience by Manager Fixed Effect
Notes: This figure is based on specification (3) in Table 9. The left panel shows the return on international experience for a manager
in an internationally active firm, and the return on domestic experience for a manager in a domestic firm, by manager fixed effect,
between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The returns do not include the static wage premium of working in an internationally active firm
(Int.Actft dummy). The right panel shows the cumulative distribution of manager fixed effects, between the 1st and 99th percentiles.
In order to better understand the quantitative implications of the estimated coefficients
from (11), we report in the left panel of Figure 5 the wage premium corresponding to a
manager that is always employed by an internationally active firm with respect to an
identical manager that is always employed by a domestic firm, by number of years of
employment (up to 10 years). In particular, in order to capture heterogeneity of returns
across ability/fixed effects, we compute the wage premium for managers corresponding
to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the managers fixed effect distribution. As shown
by the left panel of Figure 5, the premium increases with the ability of the manager
stacking up over a 10 years horizon to a wage difference of about 10% to 17% which is
quite substantial.
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Figure 5: Wage Premium in Internationally active Firms vs. Domestic Firms, Managers and
Blue-collar Workers
Notes: This figure is based on specification (3) in Table 9 (for managers) and specification (8) in Table C-5 in Appendix C (for
blue-collar workers). The left panel shows the wage premium corresponding to a manager that is always employed by an
internationally active firm with respect to an identical manager that is always employed by a domestic firm, by number of years of
employment (up to 10 years). The premium does not include the static wage premium of working in an internationally active firm
(Int. Actft dummy). The panel shows the wage premium for three types of managers, corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles of the manager fixed effect distribution of specification (3) in Table 9. The right panel of the figure is constructed in the
same way but for blue-collar workers.
The right panel of Figure 5, which is constructed in the same way as the left panel
but refers to blue-collar workers, delivers a very different message. More specifically, we
estimate specification (11) using the young blue-collar workers sample and, based on the
estimated coefficients reported in column (8) of Table C-5 in Appendix C, we compute
the wage premium corresponding to a blue-collar worker that is always employed by an
internationally active firm with respect to an identical blue-collar worker that is always
employed by a domestic firm, by number of years of employment (up to 10 years). In
particular, we compute the wage premium for a blue-collar worker corresponding to the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the blue-collar worker fixed effect distribution. In
doing so, the right panel of Figure 5 reveals that there is basically no wage premium
for blue-collar workers related to a differential value of domestic and international
experience. At the same time, columns (1) to (8) of Table C-5 in Appendix C show
evidence across specifications (4) to (11) of a consistently positive and significant wage
jump (in between 2% and 5%) associated to moving from domestic to internationally
active firms for blue-collar workers.
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In sum, our analysis suggests that managers and blue-collar workers receive higher
wages in internationally active firms because of very different mechanisms. Blue collar
workers are paid more because of wage jumps occurring when moving from a domestic
to an internationally active firm while managers are paid more because of a higher wage
growth in internationally active firms that sticks with them when, eventually, moving to
a domestic firm.
6.2 Firm Closures and Job Displacement
To strengthen the causality interpretation of our findings we consider here some more
exogenous source of variation in the data: firm closures and related job displacement.
Displaced workers have been used in many previous studies to control for selection
due to unobserved heterogeneity.25 In particular, in our analysis we first identify firm
closures and the related group of displaced young managers and subsequently follow
displaced young managers only in the first job after displacement.26 Such job will be in
either a domestic or an internationally active firm and, using data on the employment
spell corresponding to the first job after displacement, we estimate specifications (8) and
(11) while borrowing the corresponding manager and firm fixed effects from estimations
of (8) and (11) on the whole sample of young managers.27
The left panel of Figure 6 displays the distributions of the fixed effects of displaced
and non-displaced young managers corresponding to estimations of (11), while the right
panel of Figure 6 focuses on the group of displaced young managers and provides the
distribution of the fixed effects of those ending up, after displacement, in a domestic or an
internationally active firm. The left panel of Figure 6 shows that the two distributions are
extremely similar. In fact, there is only a small (and not statistically significant) average
difference in fixed effects of 0.1% actually in favour of displaced managers. At the same
time, the right panel of Figure 6 shows a very similar pattern when comparing displaced
managers ending up in a domestic or an internationally active firm; with the former
actually being characterized by a small (and not statistically significant) higher average
fixed effect of 2%. In our displaced managers regressions we indeed focus on displaced
25Examples include Kletzer (1989), Gibbons and Katz (1992) and Dustmann and Meghir (2005).
26We consider a firm as closing in year t when the firm appears for the last time in Quadros de Pessoal in
t and t ≤ 2006. Given that we use data up to 2009, this implies that we use at least 3 years of data to verify
that the firm has actually shut down and does not appear anymore in the matched employer-employee
data set.
27More specifically, we use estimated fixed effects ηi and ηf obtained from estimations of (8) and (11)
on the sample of young managers as simple covariates, instead of treating them as fixed effects, in the
estimations of (8) and (11) on the sample of displaced young managers.
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Figure 6: Fixed Effects of Displaced and non-Displaced Managers and Fixed Effects of Displaced
Managers Ending up in a Domestic or an Internationally Active Firm, Specification with Hetero-
geneous Returns on Experience
Notes: The left panel of this figure shows the density of the fixed effects for managers belonging to the young managers sample that
are displaced at least once (‘Displaced Managers’) and for managers that are never displaced (‘Non-Displaced Managers’). The right
panel instead shows the density of the fixed effects for displaced managers belonging to the young managers sample ending up in a
domestic (‘To a Domestic Firm’) or an internationally active firm (‘To an Internationally-active Firm’). The sample considered is the
one referring to the heterogeneous returns on experience specification in column (3) of Table 9.
managers only and compare the wage trajectories, in the first job after displacement, of
those ending up in domestic vs internationally active firms.
Table 10 provides estimation results for key covariates of specifications (8) and (11) on
the sample of displaced young managers. Information on additional controls is reported
in Table C-6 in Appendix C. At the same time Figure 7, which is the equivalent of Figure
4 for displaced young managers, displays the returns on domestic and international
experience by manager fixed effect (left panel) as well as the cumulative distribution of
manager fixed effects (right panel). Finally Figure 8, which is the equivalent of Figure
5 for displaced young managers and displaced blue-collar workers, shows in the left
(right) panel the wage premium corresponding to a manager (blue-collar worker) that is
always employed by an internationally active firm with respect to an identical manager
(blue-collar worker) that is always employed by a domestic firm, by number of years
of employment (up to 10 years). In particular we consider managers (blue-collar work-
ers) corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the managers (blue-collar
workers) fixed effect distribution.
Inspection of Table 10 and Figures 7 and 8 reveals that all of the findings and patterns
related the sample of young managers and blue-collar workers carry through the sample
of displaced young managers and blue-collar workers with strikingly similar magnitudes.
In particular, one more year of international experience is associated to a higher return
than one more year of domestic experience across the whole distribution of manager
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Table 10: Wage Regressions, Key Covariates, Displaced Managers
Sample
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mobility & Firm FE Heter. Returns on Exper.
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0150 0.0210a
(0.0099) (0.0069)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0323a∗∗ 0.0453a∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0010)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0506a∗∗ 0.0635a∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0016)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0011 -0.0054a
(0.0012) (0.0010)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0042a -0.0045a
(0.0016) (0.0017)
Domestic Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0109a∗∗
(0.0006)




Manager-Year Controls X X
Firm-Year Controls X X
Manager FE X X
Firm FE X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year
dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum
of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and
irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours
of work. Regressions are run on the displaced managers sample. Manager-year controls
include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year
controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity),
share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) provides key covariates of the Mobility
& Firm FE specification while column (2) provides key covariates of the Heterogeneous
Returns on Experience specification. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the
manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and
international experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of domestic experience with
the manager FE and international experience with the manager FE) are significantly different
from each other at the 5% level. Displaced managers are followed only in the first job after
displacement and so the job mobility dummy and its interaction with the internationally
active status dummy are not relevant. All results refer to OLS estimations while firm and
manager fixed effects are borrowed from the estimations of the corresponding specifications
on the sample of young managers. The reported number of observations refers to the actual
number of observations used in the estimation.
fixed effects. Furthermore, one more year of domestic and/or international experience is
more valuable to better/higher fixed effects managers while the difference between the
two returns grows with the manager fixed effects stacking up over a 10 years horizon to
a sizable wage difference of about 11% to 20%. At the same, there seems to be a rather
small, and sometimes not significant, wage jump related to moving between domestic
and internationally active firms so indicating that the bulk of managers’ wage differences
between domestic and internationally active firms is related to the differential value of
domestic and international experience. As for blue-collar workers, there is evidence of
a modest difference in the returns of domestic and international experience for the most
able workers only. Table C-7 in Appendix C shows that there is robust evidence across
specifications of a sizeable and significant wage jump associated to moving between
domestic and internationally active firms representing the bulk of blue-collar workers’
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wage differences between domestic and internationally active firms.
Figure 7: Returns on International and Domestic Experience by Manager Fixed Effect, Displaced
Managers Sample
Notes: This figure is based on specification (2) in Table 10. The left panel shows the return on international experience for a manager
in an internationally active firm, and the return on domestic experience for a manager in a domestic firm, by manager fixed effect,
between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The returns do not include the static wage premium of working in an internationally active
firm (Int. Actft dummy). The right panel shows the cumulative distribution of fixed effects, between the 1st and 99th percentiles.
6.3 Robustness of Results
To provide further robustness to our results we consider several additional enriched
versions of (11).
1. We drop those components of the salary that are linked to performance pay. This
is because internationally active firms might be using those components more
prominently than domestic firms while in our underlying framework in Section
2 we have made the assumption that domestic and internationally active firms use
such components equally.
2. We add to the regressions interaction variables between education and experience
(both domestic and international) in order to control for the different wage profiles
of more or less educated managers. For example, this allows for managers going
through University education, and so starting their career later, to have higher
returns on experience (both domestic and international).
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Figure 8: Wage Premium in Internationally active Firms vs. Domestic Firms, Managers and
Blue-collar Workers, Displaced Managers and Displaced Blue-collar Workers Samples
Notes: This figure is based on specification (2) in Table 10 and the equivalent specification estimated on the displaced blue-collar
workers sample. The left panel shows the wage premium for a manager that is always employed by an internationally active firm
with respect to an identical manager that is always employed by a domestic firm, by number of years of employment (up to 10 years).
The premium does not include the static wage premium of working in an internationally active firm (Int. Actft dummy). The panel
shows the wage premium for three types of managers, corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the manager fixed
effect distribution of specification (2) in Table 10. The right panel is constructed in the same way but for blue-collar workers.
3. We consider a number of variables that proxy for the bargaining position of a man-
ager and the related wage patterns driven by on-the-job-search and outside offers.
Indeed the labour economics literature, and in particular on-the-job search models
like Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), highlight the importance of the characteristics
of both the current and perspective employers (size and productivity), as well as
the current wage, to determine whether a worker/manager will actually change
employer as well as the wage in the new job. In particular, the larger and more
productive the initial firm is, and the lower the initial salary is, the higher is the
expected wage growth for a worker/manager whether he moves to another firm or
not. Controlling for the wage and the characteristics of the firm the manager was
working for in t− 1 (as well as for the characteristics of the firm the manager works
in t who are already in our regressions) should thus fully capture wage patterns
dictated by job searching, job hopping and outside offers. In this respect, we thus
add to our regressions log employment and productivity of the firm the manager
was working for in t− 1 as well as log wage in t− 1. More specifically, we construct
those variables in such a way that, once time-differencing our wage equation, they
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enter in levels, i.e., the level of log employment and productivity of the firm the
manager was working for in t− 1, as well as the level of log wage in t− 1, affect the
wage change between t− 1 and t: wit −wit−1.
4. We control for career concerns models dynamics and in particular for the fact that
young managers could be initially paid less in internationally active firms in the
prospect of a faster career (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). To this end, we construct
a dummy variable indicating whether a manager is 25 years old or younger and
consider both this dummy alone as well as interacted with the international active
status of the employing firm.
5. We show that our results are robust to dropping tenure in the firm and its square
as well as to interacting those tenure variables with the internationally active firm
dummy.
6. We show that our results are robust to introducing both domestic and international
experience square.
Figure 9 provides key highlights of our findings while Table C-8 in Appendix C
provides detailed regression results. In particular, Figure 9 displays the returns on
international and domestic experience, by manager fixed effect, obtained from the above
described enrichments of equation (11). As can be appreciated from Figure 9, the return
on international experience is indeed higher than the return on domestic experience,
across basically the whole fixed effects range, in all seven cases. At the same time, Table
C-8 in Appendix C does indicate that most of the issues leading us to consider enriched
versions of equation (11) find some support in the data. For example, it is indeed the
case that the wage profiles of more or less educated managers are quite different and
that the bargaining position of a manager, and the related wage patterns driven by
on-the-job-search and outside offers, are important determinants of wage changes. More
specifically, the more productive the firm the manager was working for in t − 1, and
the lower the wage of the manager in t− 1, the higher will be the increase in the wage
between t− 1 and t.
6.4 Alternative Dividing Lines between Good and Bad Jobs
We provide here evidence that the distinction between internationally active and domes-
tic firms is more powerful in capturing the dynamics of managers’ wages across different
firms than the distinction between large and small firms or the distinction between firms
with many or few layers of management.
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Figure 9: Returns on International and Domestic Experience by Manager Fixed Effect, Additional
Specifications with Heterogeneous Returns on Experience
Notes: This figure is based on enriched heterogeneous returns on experience specifications reported in columns (1) through (7) in
Table C-8 in Appendix C. Each panel shows the return on international experience for a manager in an internationally active firm, and
the return on domestic experience for a manager in a domestic firm, by manager fixed effect, between the 1st and 99th percentiles.
The returns do not include the static wage premium of working in an internationally active firm (Int. Actft dummy).
The first step in this direction is to replicate some of our results while drawing the
dividing line between good and bad firms according to firm size (big and small firms)
as well as according to the number of layers of management (high-layer and low-layer
firms).28 This is accomplished by Figure 10, and related Tables C-9 and C-10 in Appendix
C, for the number of management layers, as well as by Figure 11, and related Tables
C-11 and C-12 in Appendix C, for firm size. By comparing those set of results with
those emerging from the distinction between domestic and internationally active firms it
appears that, overall, results are very similar although sometimes less stark. In particular,
it is still the case that, for managers, the returns on experience in large or high-layer firms
are higher than the returns on experience in small or low-layer firms across the whole
28A firm is considered big if it employs 50 or more workers. A firm is considered a high-layer firm, in
a given year, if the firm has 3 layers of management. Layers are defined as in Caliendo et al. (2020). See
Appendix A for more details.
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fixed effects distribution, leading to an increasing earning premium over time reaching
about 2-6% (4-12%) over a period of 10 years. At the same time, static wage jump gains
for managers are either absent or small compared to returns on experience, while they
are important for blue-collar workers who don’t seem to face differential returns on
high-layer vs low-layer firms experience or big vs small firms experience.
The second step of our analysis instead consists in running a horse race between
the different ways of drawing the dividing line between good and bad firms. This is
accomplished by Figure 12, and related regressions Table C-13 in Appendix C, for the
horse race between the internationally active status and the number of management
layers, as well as by Figure 13, and related regressions Table C-14 in Appendix C, for the
horse-race between the internationally active status and size. For example, in Figure 12
the top left (top right) panel shows the returns on low-layer firms and high-layer firms
experience, for a manager in a domestic (internationally active) firm, by manager fixed
effect. The bottom left (bottom right) panel instead shows the returns on domestic and
international experience, for a manager in a low-layer (high-layer) firm, by manager fixed
effect. In a symmetric way, in Figure 13 the top left (top right) panel shows the returns
on small firms and large firms experience, for a manager in a domestic (internationally
active) firm, by manager fixed effect. The bottom left (bottom right) panel instead shows
the returns on domestic and international experience, for a manager in a small (big) firm,
by manager fixed effect.
In this respect, Figures 12 and 13 provide evidence that the distinction between
domestic and international experience, and the higher return associated to the latter, are
not much affected by whether the current employing firm is small or big or by whether
the current employing firm has a low or a high number of management layers. By
contrast, the distinction between small or low-layer firms experience and high-layer or
big firms experience, and the higher return associated to the latter, is quite fragile in that,
depending on whether the current employing firm is domestic or internationally active,
patterns might be much weaker or reversed.
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Figure 10: Wage Premium in High-Layer Firms vs. Low-Layer Firms, Managers and Blue-collar
Workers
Notes: This figure is based on specification (8) in Table C-9 (for managers) and specification (8) in Table C-10 (for blue-collar workers).
Both Tables are provided in Appendix C. The left panel shows the wage premium for a manager that is always employed by a
high-layer firm with respect to an identical manager that is always employed by a low-layer firm, by number of years of employment
(up to 10 years). The premium does not include the static wage premium of working in a high-layer firm (high-layer firm status
dummy). The panel shows the wage premium for three types of managers, corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of
the manager fixed effect distribution of specification (8) in Table C-9. The right panel of the figure is constructed in the same way but
for blue-collar workers.
Figure 11: Wage Premium in Big Firms vs. Small Firms, Managers and Blue-collar Workers
Notes: This figure is based on specification (8) in Table C-11 (for managers) and specification (8) in Table C-12 (for blue-collar
workers). Both Tables are provided in Appendix C. The left panel shows the wage premium for a manager that is always employed
by a big firm with respect to an identical manager that is always employed by a small firm, by number of years of employment (up
to 10 years). The premium does not include the static wage premium of working in a big firm (big firm status dummy). The panel
shows the wage premium for three types of managers, corresponding to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the manager fixed
effect distribution of specification (8) in Table C-11. The right panel of the figure is constructed in the same way but for blue-collar
workers.
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Figure 12: Returns on International and Domestic Experience vs. Return on High-Layer Firms
and Low-Layer Firms Experience
Notes: This figure is based on specifications (1) through (4) in Table C-14 in Appendix C. The top left (top right) panel shows the
returns on low-layer firms and high-layer firms experience for a manager in a domestic (internationally active) firm, by manager
fixed effect, between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The returns do not include the static wage premium of working in a high-layer firm
(high-layer firm status dummy). The bottom left (bottom right) panel shows the returns on domestic and international experience for
a manager in a low-layer (high-layer) firm, by manager fixed effect, between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The returns do not include
the static wage premium of working in an internationally active firm (Int. Actft dummy).
Figure 13: Returns on International and Domestic Experience vs. Return on Big Firms and Small
Firms Experience
Notes: This figure is based on specifications (1) through (4) in Table C-13 in Appendix C. The top left (top right) panel shows the
returns on small firms and big firms experience for a manager in a domestic (internationally active) firm, by manager fixed effect,
between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The returns do not include the static wage premium of working in a big firm (big firm status
dummy). The bottom left (bottom right) panel shows the returns on domestic and international experience for a manager in a small
(big) firm, by manager fixed effect, between the 1st and 99th percentiles. The returns do not include the static wage premium of
working in an internationally active firm (Int. Actft dummy).
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7. Quantitative Implications: Cross-sectional and Spatial Distributions
of Wages
In this Section we provide evidence that the distinction between domestic and interna-
tional experience has a number of far reaching quantitative implications for both the
cross-sectional and spatial distributions of wages.
7.1 A Simple Variance Decomposition
Showing that coefficients are significant and/or sizeable for certain groups of managers
and workers does not necessarily mean that the patterns we uncover from the data
are ‘important’ in that they explain a substantial portion of cross-sectional differences
in wages. In order to show that the distinction between domestic and international
experience is ‘important’ we thus perform here a variance decomposition analysis. We
do so for the specification in equation (8) where we now consider in the regression
overall experience and international experience, instead of domestic experience and
international experience. We report estimation highlights in Table C-15 in Appendix
C. In particular, we take the last year of the data (2006) and, while multiplying each
covariate by the corresponding estimated coefficient, we compute the standard deviation
of:
1. wit: dependent variable.
2. Worker-level controls: overall experience, tenure and its square as well as the job
mobility dummy and its interaction with the internationally active status of the
firm.
3. Firm-level controls: firm size, productivity, age and share of skilled workers.
4. Int. Exp. & IA dummies: international experience as well as the internationally
active status dummy and its interactions with overall and international experience.
5. η̂i + η̂f : manager and firm fixed effects.
6. ε̂it: residuals.
In this respect, results in Table 11 show that the standard deviation associated to the
Int. Exp. & IA dummies component is sizeable (0.052), with the bulk of the effect coming
from international experience (0.056), corresponding to about two thirds of the standard
deviation in wages that can be attributed to firm-level controls and to 55% of the of the
standard deviation in wages that can be attributed to overall experience. Furthermore,
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given our focus on young managers and the fact that young managers in our sample are
at most 33 years old, we believe those numbers in the wider population would attribute
more importance to international experience. Indeed, when focusing in Table 12 on
managers aged 30 or over, which are still quite young by any metric, we find that the gap
between the standard deviation in wages that can be attributed to overall experience and
international experience narrows substantially. The extent of the narrowing is such that
it makes us conjecture that, at some age threshold, it actually becomes more important
to know how many years of international experience managers have, as opposed to the
number of years of overall experience, in order to understand differences in their wages.
Table 11: Standard deviation of the various components of the estimated equation (8): overall




of which Overall Exper. 0.102
Firm-level controls 0.087
Int. Exp. & IA dummies 0.052
of which Internat. Exper. 0.056
η̂i + η̂f 0.462
ε̂it 0.141
Notes: This Table provides a variance decomposition analysis based on
estimations of equation (8), where overall experience and international
experience are used as covariates instead of domestic experience and
international experience. For each covariate, we compute the product of
the covariate and the corresponding estimated coefficient. We then group
the product of covariates and coefficients into groups/components and
provide the standard deviation of each component corresponding to the
year 2006.
7.2 Spatial Wage Inequality
Portugal is characterized, like most countries, by strong regional differences in wages
and incomes. For example, the left panel of Figure 14 shows the average regional hourly
wage of managers, belonging to our young managers sample, across NUTS III regions
in Portugal for the year 2006. The ratio of the highest, corresponding to the ‘Grande
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Table 12: Standard deviation of the various components of the estimated equation (8): overall




of which Overall Exper. 0.075
Firm-level contr. 0.088
Int. Exp. & IA dummies 0.059
of which Internat. Exper. 0.062
η̂i + η̂f 0.484
ε̂it 0.146
Notes: This Table provides a variance decomposition analysis based on
estimations of equation (8), where overall experience and international
experience are used as covariates instead of domestic experience and
international experience. For each covariate, we compute the product of
the covariate and the corresponding estimated coefficient. We then group
the product of covariates and coefficients into groups/components and
provide the standard deviation of each component corresponding to the
year 2006 and to managers aged 30 or older.
Lisboa’ region, to the lowest, corresponding to the ‘Pinhal Interior Sul’ region, average
regional wage is almost two while the overall coefficient of variation in the data is 0.329.
The middle panel of Figure 14 instead shows the average regional number of years
of overall experience of managers in our sample, and clearly highlights how regional
variation in overall experience is both quite limited, ranging from a minimum of 8.37
to a maximum of 9.93, and quite unrelated to differences in wages (the correlation is
actually negative at -0.270). However, the regional share of years of overall experience
corresponding to international experience, provided in the right panel of Figure 14, does
vary considerably across space, ranging from a minimum of 9% to a maximum of 39%,
and is correlated to differences in wages (a positive correlation of 0.635). In order to
get insights into the quantitative importance of international experience, and the higher
return associated to it, for the spatial distribution of wages we perform the following
counterfactual experiment. More specifically, we reallocate years of domestic and inter-
national experience across individual managers in such a way to keep the overall sum
constant, while at the same time equalizing the share of overall experience corresponding
to international experience across regions in Portugal. We then compute counterfactual
wages for managers in 2006 and compare the regional coefficients of variation of the
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observed and counterfactual wages. In doing so we find that, eliminating differences in
the share of international experience across regions, would substantially reduce spatial
inequalities in wages for Portugal by bringing down the coefficient of variation by 12.6%.
Figure 14: Hourly wage, number of years of overall experience and share of international
experience across NUTS III regions
Notes: The left panel of this map shows the average regional hourly wage of managers across NUTS III regions in Portugal. The
middle panel instead shows the average regional number of years of experience of managers while the right panel provides the
region-level share of years of experience corresponding to international experience. The legend at the bottom of each panel provides
a correspondence between colours and the class intervals (based on quintiles) corresponding to each variable. Observations refer to
the year 2006 for the sample of young managers used in the specification in column (5) of Table 8: Mobility & Firm FE.
8. Conclusions
Understanding why certain jobs are ‘better’ than others and what implications they have
for a worker’s career is an important but still relatively unexplored question. We have
provided both a theoretical framework and a number of empirical results that help
distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ jobs in terms of their impact on a worker’s lifetime
wage income profile through wage jumps occurring upon changing job (‘static effects’)
or through increases in the wage growth rate (‘dynamic effects’).
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In doing so, exploiting Portuguese matched employer-employee data, we have shown
that the distinction between internationally active firms and domestic firms is a meaning-
ful empirical dividing line between employers providing ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs. First, in
internationally active firms the experience-wage profile is much steeper than in domestic
firms, especially for managers as opposed to blue-collar workers. Second, the higher
lifetime wage income for managers in internationally active firms relies on the stronger
accumulation of valuable experience that these firms allow for and on the (almost) perfect
portability of the accumulated dynamic wage gains to other firms. Static effects are
instead much more important for blue-collar workers. In this respect it would be inter-
esting, as a further research avenue, to better understand how experience accumulated
within firms materialises and where exactly it comes from. A natural hypothesis is that
workers learn from coworkers, with better coworkers being better learners, while some
coworkers are more important than others for learning, and those coworkers are more
frequently found in internationally active firms (Jarosch et al., 2019).
We have also highlighted that the distinction between internationally active and do-
mestic firms is relevant at the aggregate level to explain cross-sectional differences in
wages among workers and spatial differences in average wages across regions within a
country. Another natural direction of future research would be to extend the analysis to
countries other than Portugal. This could help shed new light on the sources of divergent
firm dynamics across countries (especially between developed and developing ones) in
process efficiency, quality and ability to penetrate home and foreign markets, which
have been shown to drive a substantial part of cross-country differences in aggregate
productivity (Hsieh and Klenow, 2014).
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Appendix: Additional Details about Data, Tables and Figures
The analysis relies on two major datasets: an international trade dataset at the
transaction-level, and a matched employer-employee dataset, both for Portugal covering
the period 1991-2006. We describe each of the two datasets in the main text. Here we
provide more details on how we construct the combined sample used in the analysis,
and we provide the definitions of the key variables employed in the analysis.
A-1. Combined dataset, data processing, and regression sample
In order to combine the trade and matched employer-employee data we start from the
workers’ module of the latter. Each worker in Quadros de Pessoal (QP) has a unique,
time-invariant, identifier based on her social security number. We drop from the sample
a minority of workers with an invalid social security number and with multiple jobs. If a
worker is employed in a particular year, we observe the corresponding firm identifier for
that year. Since worker-level variables are missing in 2001, we assign a firm to workers
in 2001 in the following way: if a worker is employed by firm A in 2002 and the year in
which the worker had been hired (by firm A) is before 2001 or is 2001, then we assign
the worker to firm A in 2001 as well; for all other workers, we repeat the procedure
using 2003. In case neither 2002 nor 2003 allow us to assign a firm to a worker in 2001,
we leave the information as missing.
We then merge the firm-level module of QP, as well as firm-year trade information
computed via the international trade dataset, by means of the firm identifier. In the
trade dataset, we restrict the sample to transactions registered as sales as opposed to
returns, transfers of goods without transfer of ownership, and work done. We then
compute total exports and imports aggregating the data at the firm-year level. We then
select observations according to both firm-level and worker-level characteristics. First, as
in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), we account for sectoral and geographical specificities of
Portugal by restricting the sample to include only firms based in continental Portugal
while excluding ‘Badly defined activities’, ‘Extra-territorial organizations and bodies’,
‘Public administration and defense’, ‘Business and professional associations’, and ‘Other
social and related community services’. The location of the firm is measured according
to the NUTS III regional disaggregation. This includes Alentejo Central, Alentejo
Litoral, Algarve, Alto Alentejo, Ave, Baixo Alentejo, Baixo Mondego, Baixo Vouga, Beira
Int. N., Beira Int. S., Cova da Beira, Cávaado, Dão-Lafões, Douro, Douro e Vouga,
Grande Lisboa, Grande Porto, Leziria do Tejo, Minho-Lima, Médio Tejo, Oeste, P. de
Setúbal, Pinhal Int. N., Pinhal Int. S., Pinhal Litoral, Serra da Estrela, Tamega, and
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Trás-os-Montes. We also drop from the sample all firms that were founded before 1600.
Concerning workers, we consider only single-job, full-time workers between 16 and 65
years old, and working between 25 and 80 hours (base plus overtime) per week. In
the analysis we further restrict the sample to workers between 18 and 33 years old, in
order to observe their full working history. We construct two measures of the hourly
wage. The baseline measure is defined as the sum of the monthly base wage (gross
pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements,
divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. A second
measure abstracts from performance-pay components: overtime and irregularly paid
supplements. To control for outliers, we apply a trimming based on the baseline hourly
wage and eliminate 0.5 percent of the observations on both extremes of the distribution.
Largest Connected Group Sample We replicate a number of regressions of our analysis
using a more restricted sample that is common to all specifications. We build such a
sample by taking the sample of the specification ‘Mobility & Firm FE’ and including
only the largest connected group (Abowd et al., 2002) using the stata ado file group2hdfe.
A-2. Key variables and definitions
Some concepts are recurring in the explanation of a majority of the Tables and Figures.
We describe them here.
Tenure
QP includes a variable that records the year in which the worker started working in a
given firm (admission year). In order to avoid measurement error we first construct a
robust version of the year of admission by computing the mode for each worker-firm
pair. Ties are broken by picking the minimum year of admission. Then tenure is
computed as the difference between the current year and the constructed year of
admission.
Age and Education
QP includes a variable that records the year in which the worker was born. In order
to avoid measurement error we first construct a robust version of the birth year by
computing the mode for each worker. Ties are broken by picking the minimum birth
year. Then age is computed as the difference between the current year and the birth
year. QP also include information on the degrees (or partial degrees) obtained by each
worker in a given year. We thank Anabela Carneiro for providing us with the conversion
table between education categories and number of years of schooling. In our analysis
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we consider the mode of the distribution of the number of years of education for each
manager. Indeed, there is likely to be a fair amount of measurement error related to this
variable and so changes over time are likely to mainly pick up such measurement error
rather than a genuine change in the number of years of education.
Experience Experience is defined as age minus the number of years of education
minus 6 for workers with 12 or more years of education, and as age minus 18 for
workers with less than 12 years of education. We replace experience to missing for a few
cases in which it is negative (e.g. when a person starts working before finishing to study).
Internationally Active Firm Status and International (vs. Domestic) Experience
A firm is considered internationally active in a given year if either exports are strictly
positive, or imports are strictly positive, or the firm is foreign owned. A firm is
considered foreign-owned in a given year if the share of equity that is foreign-owned is
higher than 50 percent. We compute a worker international experience in a given year
as the number of years the worker has been employed by internationally active firms. To
make the information on international experience and experience consistent we do the
following: First, we replace international experience to missing whenever experience is
missing. Second, we replace international experience to experience whenever the former
is higher than the latter. Finally, we build domestic experience as the difference between
experience and international experience.
High-Layer Firm Status and High-Layer (vs. Low-Layer) Firms Experience
A firm is considered a high-layer firm (low-layer), in a given year, if the firm has 3
layers (less than 3 layers) of management. Layers of management are defined as in
Caliendo et al. (2020). In the matched employer-employee data set, each worker has to
be assigned to a category following a (compulsory) classification of workers defined by
the Portuguese law (see Table 13 and Mion and Opromolla (2014)). Such classification
is based on the tasks performed and skill requirements, and each category can be
considered as a level in a hierarchy defined in terms of increasing responsibility and task
complexity. On the basis of the hierarchical classification, and taking into consideration
the actual wage distribution, we partition the available categories into occupations. We
assign ‘Top executives (top management)’ to occupation 3; ‘Intermediary executives
(middle management)’ and ‘Supervisors, team leaders’ to occupation 2; ‘Higher-skilled
professionals’ and some ‘Skilled professionals’ to occupation 1; and the remaining
employees, including ‘Skilled professionals’, ‘Semi-skilled professional’, ‘Non-skilled
professionals’, and ‘Apprenticeship’ to occupation 0. A firm reporting c occupational
categories will be said to have L = c− 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we
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will have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (Caliendo et al., 2020). In
terms of layers within a firm we do not keep track of the specific occupational categories
but simply rank them. Hence a firm with occupational categories 2 and 0 will have 1
layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer 0 corresponding to
some skilled and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to intermediary
executives and supervisors. We compute a worker high-layer experience in a given year
as the number of years the worker has been employed by a high-layer firm (including
the current employer). To make the information on high-layer experience and experience
consistent we do the following: First, we replace high-layer experience to missing
whenever experience is missing. Second, we replace high-layer experience to experience
whenever the former is higher than the latter. Finally, we build low-layer experience as
the difference between experience and high-layer experience.
Big Firm Status and Big (vs. Small) Firms Experience
A firm is considered big if it employs 50 or more workers. We compute a worker big
firm experience in a given year as the number of years the worker has been employed
by a big firm (including the current employer). To make the information on big firm
experience and experience consistent we do the following: First, we replace big firm
experience to missing whenever experience is missing. Second, we replace big firm
experience to experience whenever the former is higher than the latter. Finally, we
build small firm experience as the difference between experience and big firm experience.
Managers and Blue-collar Workers
We identify managers and blue-collar workers using the same classification used to
construct occupations and layers (see above and Table 13). This classification is based on
the tasks performed and skill requirements, and each category can be considered as a
level in a hierarchy defined in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. We
identify managers as those workers belonging to one of the top three 1-digit categories:
‘Top executives (top management)’, ‘Intermediary executives (middle management)’ and
‘Supervisors, team leaders’. We identify blue-collar workers as those workers belonging
to either, ‘Semi-skilled professionals’, or ‘Non-skilled professionals’.
Normal Working Hours
Number of paid hours in October corresponding to the normal working period. Paid
absences from work are included (e.g. holidays, illness, accident).
Overtime Hours
Overtime is time worked in October in addition to hours worked during the normal
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working period, both during working days and during holidays.
Basic Remuneration
The gross amount, before deduction of taxes and social security contributions, in cash or
in kind, paid regularly in October and corresponding to the normal working period.
Overtime Remuneration
The gross amount, before deduction of taxes and social security contributions, in cash or
in kind, paid in October and corresponding to the overtime hours.
Regular Bonuses and Allowances
Gross amount paid regularly, on a monthly basis, to employees for a particular time
period, as is the case with food, job, housing or transport allowance, bounty or seniority
payments, performance-related pay, diligence bonus, compensation for arduous,
dangerous or dirty work, night or shift differential. It does not include retroactive
payments, compensations, Christmas or other vacation bonuses that were paid in
October.
Irregular Bonuses and Allowances
Gross amount paid on an irregular basis, that is not on a monthly basis, to employees for
a particular time period, such as profit sharing, stock options or other incentive bonuses
and other non-periodical payments. It includes retroactive payments, compensations,
Christmas or other vacation bonuses that were paid in October.
A-3. High-dimensional fixed effects
All specifications in the paper are estimated with OLS. With large data sets, estimation
of a linear regression model with two or more high-dimensional fixed effects poses
some computational challenges (Abowd et al., 1999). However, the exact least-square
solution to this problem can be found using an algorithm, based on the ‘zigzag’ or
full Gauss-Seidel algorithm, proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010). We use, for
our estimations, the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and
Portugal (2010)’s algorithm. The main advantage of this routine is the ability to fit
linear regression models with two or more high-dimensional fixed effects under minimal
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Table 13: Classification of Workers According to Tasks and Skills
Level Tasks Skills
1. Top executives (top management) Definition of the firm general policy
or consulting on the organization of
the firm; strategic planning; creation or
adaptation of technical, scientific and
administrative methods or processes
Knowledge of management and coordi-
nation of firmŠs fundamental activities;
knowledge of management and coordi-
nation of the fundamental activities in
the field to which the individual is as-
signed and that requires the study and
research of high responsibility and tech-
nical level problems
2. Intermediary executives (middle management) Organization and adaptation of the
guidelines established by the superiors
and directly linked with the executive
work
Technical and professional qualifica-
tions directed to executive, research, and
management work
3. Supervisors, team leaders Orientation of teams, as directed by the




4. Higher-skilled professionals Tasks requiring a high technical value
and defined in general terms by the su-
periors
Complete professional qualification
with a specialization adding to
theoretical and applied knowledge
5. Skilled professionals Complex or delicate tasks, usually not
repetitive, and defined by the superiors
Complete professional qualification im-
plying theoretical and applied knowl-
edge
6. Semi-skilled professionals Well defined tasks, mainly manual or
mechanical (no intellectual work) with
low complexity, usually routine and
sometimes repetitive
Professional qualification in a limited
field or practical and elementary profes-
sional knowledge
7. Non-skilled professionals Simple tasks and totally determined Practical knowledge and easily acquired
in a short time
8. Apprentices, interns, trainees Apprenticeship
Notes: Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd (Lima and Pereira, 2003)
memory requirements. Moreover, the routine provides standard errors correctly adjusted
for the presence of the fixed effects. We apply the reghdfe routine setting the convergence
criterion for the iteration method to 0.001.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure C-1: Growth Rate of Sales, Domestic vs. Internationally active Firms, Young Managers
Sample
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of the growth rates of sales for internationally active and domestic firms in the young
managers sample obtained while controlling for firm size, age, location, industry, and year effects. More specifically, we regress the
growth rate of sales, computed as the difference in sales between t and t+ 1 divided by the average sales in t and t+ 1, on the log of
firm size (sales) in t, the log of the age of the firm in t, a set of year, region (NUTS III) and industry (1-digit NACE) dummies. Then
we take the residuals, drop observations below (above) the bottom (top) 1 percent, and use them to construct the densities plotted in
the figure.
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Figure C-2: Experience-wage Profiles in the Manufacturing Sector, Domestic vs. Internationally
active Firms, Managers and Blue-collars Workers, Large Sample
Notes: This figure shows experience-wage profiles for managers (left panel) and blue-collar workers (right panel) of domestic and
internationally active firms in the manufacturing sector. To compute the experience-wage profiles, we first regress hourly wages
against a full set of year, region (NUTS III), and 1-digit NACE industry dummies. We then compute, for each type of firm, the
average residual hourly wage by number of years of experience (up to 10). Finally, we compute the percentage wage increase relative
to the case of one year of experience. The blue and green bands represent confidence intervals at the 95% level.
57
Figure C-3: Experience-wage Profiles in the Services Sector, Domestic vs. Internationally active
Firms, Managers and Blue-collars Workers, Large Sample
Notes: This figure shows experience-wage profiles for managers (left panel) and blue-collar workers (right panel) of domestic and
internationally active firms in the services sector. To compute the experience-wage profiles, we first regress hourly wages against a
full set of year, region (NUTS III), and 1-digit NACE industry dummies. We then compute, for each type of firm, the average residual
hourly wage by number of years of experience (up to 10). Finally, we compute the percentage wage increase relative to the case of
one year of experience. The blue and green bands represent confidence intervals at the 95% level.
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Figure C-4: Experience-Wage Profiles in Domestic vs. Internationally active Firms, Managers
and Blue-collar Workers, Young Managers Sample
Notes: This figure shows experience-wage profiles for managers (left panel) and blue-collar workers (right panel) of domestic and
internationally active firms in the young managers sample. To compute the experience-wage profiles, we first regress hourly wages
against a full set of year, region (NUTS III) and industry (1-digit NACE) dummies. We then compute, for each type of firm, the
average residual hourly wage by number of years of experience (up to 10). Finally, we compute the percentage wage increase relative
to the case of one year of experience. The blue and green bands represent confidence intervals at the 95% level.
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Table C-1: Descriptive Statistics for the Young Blue-
Collars Sample, Year 2006
Key Worker-level Variables
N. observ. Mean St.dev. Min Max
Log Hourly Wage 180,468 -0.25 0.31 -1.64 2.02
Tenure 180,468 3.29 3.59 0.00 32.00
Job Mobility 180,468 1.65 0.93 1.00 10.00
Domestic Experience 180,468 6.58 4.12 0.00 15.00
International Experience 180,468 2.17 2.95 0.00 15.00
Key Firm-level Variables
N. observ. Mean St.dev. Min Max
Size 53,552 2.20 1.26 0.00 9.64
Productivity 53,552 10.68 1.07 3.22 17.49
Log Firm Age 53,552 2.37 0.89 0.00 5.94
Share Skilled 53,552 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00
Internationally Active 53,552 0.21 0.40 0.00 1.00
Notes: Data refer to the young blue-collars sample for the year 2006. Con-
cerning blue-collar worker-level variables, the (log) hourly wage is defined as
the (log of the) sum of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours
of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by
the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Tenure refers to
the number of years the blue-collar worker has been working for the current
employer while job mobility indicates the number of times (plus one) the
blue-collar worker has changed employer up to year t. Domestic experience
is number of years a blue-collar worker has worked in the past for domes-
tic firms (including the current firm) while international experience is the
number of years a blue-collar worker has worked in the past for intentionally
active firms (including the current firm). Moving to firm-level variables, size
is firm log employment, productivity is log apparent labour productivity,
the share of skilled workers is the share of a firm’s workers (managers and
non-managers) with 12 or more years of education, log firm age is the log of
the age of the firm and internationally active is a dummy taking value one if
the firm is involved in exporting and/or importing and/or is foreign owned
and zero otherwise. See Appendix A for more details.
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Figure C-5: Wage and Fixed Effects of Movers and Stayers, Specification Mobility & Firm FE
Notes: This figure shows the density of the hourly wage (left panel) and the fixed effects (right panel) for managers belonging to the
young managers sample that change firm at least once (‘movers’) and for managers that always stay in the same firm (‘stayers’). The
sample considered is the one referring to the Mobility & Firm FE specification in column (5) of Table 8.
Table C-2: Wage Regressions, Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE Job-Spell FE Ind. Linear Trends Heter. Returns on Exper.
Tenure (Yrs) 0.0109a 0.0052a 0.0045a 0.0045a 0.0173a 0.0319a 0.0168a 0.0172a
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0054) (0.0025) (0.0005)
Tenure Sq. (Yrs) -0.0005a -0.0015a -0.0016a -0.0016a -0.0017a -0.0017a -0.0016a -0.0015a
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001)
Education (Yrs) 0.0512a
(0.0004)
Firm Size (log) 0.0457a 0.0339a 0.0342a 0.0340a 0.0427a 0.0531a 0.0329a 0.0286a
(0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0020)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.0385a 0.0132a 0.0125a 0.0125a 0.0071a 0.0075a 0.0071a 0.0042a
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0009)
Firm Age (log) 0.0130a -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0188a -0.0154a 0.0114a -0.0271a
(0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0020)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.0008 0.0079b 0.0078b 0.0080b 0.0292a 0.0274a -0.0033 0.0514a
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0061) (0.0038)
Observations 322,360 254,990 254,990 254,990 249,562 233,629 104,921 147,367
R-squared 0.3059 0.8767 0.8773 0.8774 0.9105 0.9143 0.8719 0.9985
Manager-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Region FE X
Manager FE X X X X X X
Firm FE X X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: Additional controls to the regressions of Tables 8 and 9. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table C-3: Wage Regressions, Simple Specifications, Main Covariates, Largest Connected
Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.1788a 0.0367a 0.0290a 0.0566a 0.0002
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0081) (0.0066)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0274a 0.0580a
(0.0007) (0.0011)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0497a∗∗ 0.0510a∗∗ 0.0409a∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0020)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0654a∗∗ 0.0691a∗∗ 0.0540a∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0046a -0.0009
(0.0012) (0.0010)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0034c 0.0004
(0.0018) (0.0013)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0540a
(0.0050)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0035
(0.0034)
Observations 147,367 147,367 147,367 147,367 147,367
R-squared 0.1760 0.8414 0.8418 0.8419 0.8901
Manager-Year Controls X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X
Region FE X
Manager FE X X X X
Firm FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table replicates the specifications of Table 8 using a more restricted sample obtained as the intersection of the
sample of specification (5) in Table 8 and the largest connected group (using the Stata ado-file group2hdfe). Standard errors
(in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic
and international experience are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations
obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal
with high-dimensional fixed effects.
Table C-4: Manager Fixed Effects Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE Ind. Linear Trends Heter. Returns on Exper.
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.1876a 0.1359a 0.1286a 0.1146a 0.0792a 0.0131a
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0054) (0.0035)
Constant -0.1023a -0.0741a -0.0701a -0.0631a -0.2130a 0.0371a
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0045) (0.0031)
Observations 254,990 254,990 254,990 249,562 104,921 147,367
R-squared 0.0412 0.0227 0.0204 0.0177 0.0059 0.0003
Notes: The dependent variable is the estimated manager fixed effect from the corresponding specifications of Tables 8 and 9. Standard errors (in
parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table C-5: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, Blue-collar Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE Job-Spell FE Ind. Linear Trends Heter. Returns on Exper.
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0411a 0.0344a 0.0335a 0.0551a 0.0230a 0.0248a 0.0447a 0.0235a
(0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0013)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0035a 0.0044a
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0036a∗∗ 0.0045a∗∗ 0.0012b 0.0066a -0.0014c∗∗ 0.0009a∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0001)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0057a∗∗ 0.0087a∗∗ 0.0019b 0.0077a 0.0041a∗∗ 0.0019a∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0002)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0040a -0.0031a -0.0033a -0.0039a -0.0035a
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0023a -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0002)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0077a 0.0020 0.0209a
(0.0017) (0.0041) (0.0027)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0023c -0.0040a 0.0093a
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0018)
Domestic Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) 0.0032a∗∗
(0.0002)
International Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) 0.0262a∗∗
(0.0004)
Observations 1,241,198 963,851 963,851 963,851 937,485 840,396 425,150 735,542
R-squared 0.1542 0.7173 0.7173 0.7174 0.7865 0.7923 0.6655 0.9988
Worker-Year Controls X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Region FE X
Worker FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the
monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work.
Regressions are run on the young blue-collars sample. Worker-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm
size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the OLS specification. The FE specification in column (2)
includes worker fixed effects. Column (3) distinguishes between experience in domestic and internationally active firms. Column (4) allows the return on domestic and international experience
to be different according to the international status of the firm. Column (5) features firm fixed effects while introducing a control for job changes both alone and interacted with the international
status of the employing firm in t. Column (6) reports the Job-Spell FE specification using firm-worker FE instead of separate worker and firm FE. The Individual Linear Trends specification
in column (7) includes both standard worker fixed effects as well as the interactions between separate worker fixed effects and a linear trend. The Heterogeneous Returns on Experience
specification in column (8) instead uses worker and firm FE while adding two interaction terms of worker FE with domestic and international experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered at the worker level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and international experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of domestic
experience with worker FE and international experience with worker FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata
user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual
number of observations used by the estimation procedure. For example, in the case of worker fixed effects in column (2) the number of observations does not include workers for which only
one observation is available. Such workers are instead included in the number of observations in column (1).
Table C-6: Wage Regressions, Controls, Displaced Managers
Sample
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mobility & Firm FE Heter. Returns on Exper.
Tenure (Yrs) 0.0123a 0.0119a
(0.0021) (0.0010)
Tenure Sq. (Yrs) -0.0014a -0.0016a
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Firm Size (log) 0.0455a 0.0275a
(0.0006) (0.0007)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.0066a 0.0023b
(0.0012) (0.0010)
Firm Age (log) -0.0207a -0.0296a
(0.0014) (0.0012)




Manager-Year Controls X X
Firm-Year Controls X X
Manager FE X X
Firm FE X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS
Notes: Additional controls to the regressions of Table 10. Standard errors (in paren-
thesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1.
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Table C-7: Wage Regressions, Key Covariates, Displaced Blue-
Collar Workers Sample
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Mobility & Firm FE Heter. Returns on Exper.
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0258a 0.0224a
(0.0036) (0.0002)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0008a 0.0015a
(0.0002) (0.0000)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0021a 0.0032a
(0.0005) (0.0001)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0028a -0.0035a
(0.0003) (0.0000)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0006 -0.0005a
(0.0007) (0.0001)
Domestic Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) 0.0026a
(0.0000)




Worker-Year Controls X X
Firm-Year Controls X X
Worker FE X X
Firm FE X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year
dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum
of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and
irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime
hours of work. Regressions are run on the displaced blue-collar workers sample. Worker-
year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its
square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent
labour productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) provides key
covariates of the Mobility & Firm FE specification while column (2) provides key covariates
of the Heterogeneous Returns on Experience specification. Standard errors (in parenthesis)
are clustered at the worker level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the
coefficients of domestic and international experience (or the coefficients of the interactions
of domestic experience with the worker FE and international experience with the worker
FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. Displaced blue-collar workers
are followed only in the first job after displacement and so the job mobility dummy and its
interaction with the internationally active status dummy are not relevant. All results refer to
OLS estimations while firm and worker fixed effects are borrowed from the estimations of
the corresponding specifications on the sample of young blue-collar workers. The reported
number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used in the estimation.
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Table C-8: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, Additional Specifications with Heterogeneous Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES No Performance Pay Education Bargaining Power Career Concerns No Tenure Tenure by Firm Status Experience Squared
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) -0.0056b -0.0003 -0.0036 0.0019 0.0100a -0.0021 -0.0027
(0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0045)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0389a∗∗ 0.0401a∗∗ 0.0365a∗∗ 0.0350a∗∗ 0.0423a∗∗ 0.0383a∗∗ 0.0498a∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0011)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0467a∗∗ 0.0303a∗∗ 0.0525a∗∗ 0.0470a∗∗ 0.0536a∗∗ 0.0504a∗∗ 0.0668a∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0013)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0006b -0.0009a -0.0003 -0.0010b -0.0025a -0.0013a -0.0012
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) 0.0019a 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0019
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0015)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0574a 0.0519a 0.0494a 0.0524a 0.0484a 0.0548a 0.0482a
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0024c -0.0057a -0.0044b -0.0049a -0.0066a -0.0046b -0.0030
(0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Domestic Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0214a∗∗ 0.0163a∗∗ 0.0125a∗∗ 0.0116a∗∗ 0.0100a∗∗ 0.0123a∗∗ 0.0126a∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
International Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0254a∗∗ 0.0219a∗∗ 0.0283a∗∗ 0.0276a∗∗ 0.0315a∗∗ 0.0271a∗∗ 0.0248a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Domestic Exp. * Education (Yrs) -0.0001a
(0.0000)
International Exp. * Education (Yrs) 0.0015a
(0.0000)
Firm Size t-1 (log) 0.0009
(0.0014)
App. Labor Productivity t-1 (log) 0.0132a
(0.0011)
Hourly Wage t-1 (log) -0.0316a
(0.0023)
Age up to 25 (0/1) -0.0391a
(0.0026)
Age up to 25 * Int. Act. Firm (0/1) -0.0031
(0.0031)
Tenure * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) 0.0037a
(0.0012)
Ten. Sq. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0005a
(0.0001)
Domestic Exp. Squared -0.0009a
(0.0001)
International Exp. Squared -0.0022a
(0.0002)
Dom. Exp. Sq. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0002a
(0.0001)
Int.Exp. Sq. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) 0.0003
(0.0002)
Observations 147,367 147,367 147,367 147,367 147,367 147,367 147,367
R-squared 0.9989 0.9985 0.9984 0.9985 0.9983 0.9984 0.9986
Manager-Year Controls X X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X
Manager FE X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table proposes a number of extensions of the heterogeneous returns specification of column (3) of Table 9. The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using
a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined, in all specification except that of column (1), as the sum of the monthly base wage (gross
pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. In column (1), the hourly
wage does not include those components that depends on performance: overtime and irregularly paid supplements. Regressions are run on the young managers sample. Manager-year
controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour
productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) excludes any performance-pay component from the hourly wage. The specification in column (2) allows for the
return on domestic and international experience to be heterogeneous according to the education level of the worker. Column (3) controls for measures of bargaining power indicated by
wage bargaining models (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002). Column (4) addresses the possibility that internationally active firms might offer lower initial wages in the prospect of a faster
career (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992) by including a dummy for managers younger than 25 years old, as well as its interaction with the international status of the firm. Column (5) does
not include the tenure controls. Column (6) allows the return on tenure to be different in domestic and internationally active firms. Column (7) includes a quadratic in domestic and
international experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and international
experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of domestic experience with manager FE and international experience with manager FE) are significantly different from each other
at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with
high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation procedure.
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Table C-9: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, Managers, High-Layer and Low-Layer Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE Job-Spell FE Ind. Linear Trends Heter. Returns on Exper.
High-layer Firm (0/1) 0.0793a 0.0037 -0.0124a -0.0093a -0.0213a -0.0148a -0.0278a -0.0339a
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0061) (0.0030)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0206a 0.0515a
(0.0004) (0.0009)
Low-layer Exp. (Yrs) 0.0337a∗∗ 0.0332a∗∗ 0.0147a 0.0093a 0.0182a 0.0249a∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0027) (0.0003)
High-layer Exp. (Yrs) 0.0418a∗∗ 0.0488a∗∗ 0.0163a 0.0100a 0.0235a 0.0214a∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0054) (0.0013)
Low-layer Exp. * High-layer Firm (Yrs) 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0022b 0.0097a -0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0003)
High-layer Exp. * High-layer Firm (Yrs) -0.0079a 0.0043c 0.0041 0.0054 0.0044a
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0046) (0.0013)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.1151a 0.0956a 0.0850a
(0.0049) (0.0099) (0.0087)
Job Mobility * High-layer Firm (Dummy) -0.0130a -0.0093a 0.0023
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0058)
High-layer Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0052a∗∗
(0.0007)
Low-layer Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) -0.0034a∗∗
(0.0003)
Observations 322,360 254,990 254,990 254,990 194,542 180,277 54,856 114,522
R-squared 0.3001 0.8765 0.8738 0.8738 0.9152 0.9188 0.7668 1.0000
Manager-Year Controls X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Region FE X
Manager FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the
monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work.
Regressions are run on the young managers sample. Manager-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm
size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the OLS specification. The FE specification in column
(2) includes manager fixed effects. Column (3) distinguishes between experience in low-layer and high-layer firms. Column (4) allows the return on low-layer and high-layer experience to be
different according to the high-layer status of the firm. Column (5) features firm fixed effects while introducing a control for job changes both alone and interacted with the high-layer status of
the employing firm in t. Column (6) reports the Job-Spell FE specification using firm-manager FE instead of separate manager and firm FE. The Individual Linear Trends specification in column
(7) includes both standard manager fixed effects as well as the interactions between separate manager fixed effects and a linear trend. The Heterogeneous Returns on Experience specification in
column (8) instead uses manager and firm FE while adding two interaction terms of manager FE with low-layer and high-layer experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the
manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of low-layer and high-layer experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of low-layer experience with manager
FE and high-layer experience with manager FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe
implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used
by the estimation procedure. For example, in the case of manager fixed effects in column (2) the number of observations does not include managers for which only one observation is available.
Such managers are instead included in the number of observations in column (1).
Table C-10: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, Blue-Collar Workers, High-Layer and Low-Layer Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS FE Type of Experience Portability Mobility & Firm FE Job-Spell FE Ind. Linear Trends Heter. Returns on Exper.
High-layer Firm (0/1) 0.0503a 0.0158a 0.0114a 0.0147a 0.0042a 0.0059a 0.0067a 0.0045a
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0010)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0029a 0.0039a
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Low-layer Exp. (Yrs) 0.0035a 0.0040a 0.0031a 0.0025a 0.0011∗∗ 0.0034a∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001)
High-layer Exp. (Yrs) 0.0042a 0.0023b 0.0018c 0.0015 -0.0031c∗∗ 0.0013a∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0004)
Low-layer Exp. * High-layer Firm (Yrs) -0.0036a -0.0042a -0.0051a -0.0021b -0.0046a
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0001)
High-layer Exp. * High-layer Firm (Yrs) 0.0035a -0.0003 -0.0010 0.0057a 0.0002
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0005)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0038a 0.0137a 0.0121a
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0032)
Job Mobility * High-layer Firm (Dummy)) -0.0012 0.0006 0.0083a
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0022)
High-layer Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) 0.0005∗∗
(0.0008)
Low-layer Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) -0.0029a∗∗
(0.0002)
Observations 1,241,198 963,851 963,851 963,851 770,237 681,697 275,522 607,517
R-squared 0.1548 0.7169 0.7170 0.7171 0.7905 0.7951 0.5129 1.0000
Worker-Year Controls X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Region FE X
Worker FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the monthly
base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Regressions are run
on the young blue-collars sample. Worker-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment),
productivity (log apparent labour productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the OLS specification. The FE specification in column (2) includes worker fixed
effects. Column (3) distinguishes between experience in low-layer and high-layer firms. Column (4) allows the return on low-layer and high-layer experience to be different according to the
high-layer status of the firm. Column (5) features firm fixed effects while introducing a control for job changes both alone and interacted with the high-layer status of the employing firm in t.
Column (6) reports the Job-Spell FE specification using firm-worker FE instead of separate worker and firm FE. The Individual Linear Trends specification in column (7) includes both standard
worker fixed effects as well as the interactions between separate worker fixed effects and a linear trend. The Heterogeneous Returns on Experience specification in column (8) instead uses worker
and firm FE while adding two interaction terms of worker FE with low-layer and high-layer experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the worker level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c
p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of low-layer and high-layer experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of low-layer experience with worker FE and high-layer experience with worker
FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal
(2010)’s methodology to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation procedure. For example,
in the case of worker fixed effects in column (2) the number of observations does not include workers for which only one observation is available. Such workers are instead included in the number
of observations in column (1).
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Table C-11: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, Managers, Big and Small Firm Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES First Model Worker FE Type of Experience Portability Firm FE Job Mobility Job-Spell FE Individual Linear Trends Heterogeneous returns on experience
Big Firm (0/1) 0.1269a 0.0265a -0.0175a -0.0364a 0.0018 0.0101 -0.0028 0.0399a
(0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0097) (0.0145) (0.0051)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0212a 0.0518a
(0.0004) (0.0010)
Small Exp. (Yrs) 0.0357a∗∗ 0.0341a∗∗ 0.0121a∗∗ -0.0005∗∗ 0.0167a∗∗ 0.0226a∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0004)
Big Exp. (Yrs) 0.0507a∗∗ 0.0548a∗∗ 0.0236a∗∗ 0.0110a∗∗ 0.0328a∗∗ 0.0298a∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0041) (0.0009)
Small Exp. * Big Firm (Yrs) 0.0101a 0.0022 -0.0024 0.0081b -0.0032a
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0004)
Big Exp. * Big Firm (Yrs) -0.0061b 0.0021 0.0017 0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0039) (0.0010)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.1076a 0.1015a 0.0921a
(0.0053) (0.0103) (0.0074)
Job Mobility * Big Firm (Dummy) -0.0126a -0.0048 -0.0212a
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0061)
Big Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0188a∗∗
(0.0004)
Small Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0050a∗∗
(0.0002)
Observations 268,894 199,982 199,982 199,982 194,542 180,277 54,625 111,199
R-squared 0.3047 0.8807 0.8795 0.8795 0.9154 0.9189 0.8336 0.9994
Manager-Year Controls X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Region FE X
Manager FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the monthly base wage (gross
pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Regressions are run on the young managers sample.
Manager-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity),
share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the OLS specification. The FE specification in column (2) includes manager fixed effects. Column (3) distinguishes between experience in small and
big firms. Column (4) allows the return on small and big firm experience to be different according to the size status of the firm. Column (5) features firm fixed effects while introducing a control for job changes
both alone and interacted with the size status of the employing firm in t. Column (6) reports the Job-Spell FE specification using firm-manager FE instead of separate manager and firm FE. The Individual Linear
Trends specification in column (7) includes both standard manager fixed effects as well as the interactions between separate manager fixed effects and a linear trend. The Heterogeneous Returns on Experience
specification in column (8) instead uses manager and firm FE while adding two interaction terms of manager FE with small and big experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level.
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of small and big firm experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of small firm experience with manager FE and big firm experience with manager
FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology
to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation procedure. For example, in the case of manager fixed effects in
column (2) the number of observations does not include managers for which only one observation is available. Such managers are instead included in the number of observations in column (1).
Table C-12: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, Blue-Collar Workers, Big and Small Firm Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES First Model Worker FE Type of Experience Portability Firm FE Job Mobility Job-Spell FE Individual Linear Trends Heterogeneous returns on experience
Big Firm (0/1) 0.0334a 0.0311a 0.0273a 0.0435a 0.0254a 0.0270a 0.0290a 0.0242a
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0017)
Experience (Yrs) 0.0030a 0.0042a
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Small Exp. (Yrs) 0.0044a 0.0053a 0.0042a 0.0048a 0.0015b∗∗ 0.0038a
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0001)
Big Exp. (Yrs) 0.0037a 0.0060a 0.0033a 0.0056a 0.0048a∗∗ 0.0032a
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0003)
Small Exp. * Big Firm (Yrs) -0.0064a -0.0068a -0.0084a -0.0049a -0.0068a
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0001)
Big Exp. * Big Firm (Yrs) -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0027b 0.0026b -0.0013a
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0003)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0045a 0.0108a 0.0190a
(0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0027)
Job Mobility * Big Firm (Dummy) -0.0056a -0.0037b 0.0003
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0023)
Big Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) 0.0117a∗∗
(0.0005)
Small Exp. * Worker FE (Yrs) 0.0034a∗∗
(0.0002)
Observations 1,083,858 796,461 796,461 796,461 770,237 681,697 285,875 596,033
R-squared 0.1464 0.7171 0.7171 0.7173 0.7906 0.7952 0.6119 0.9997
Worker-Year Controls X X X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X X X X X
Region FE X
Worker FE X X X X X
Firm FE X X
Individual Linear Trends X
Job-Spell FE X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the monthly base wage (gross
pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Regressions are run on the young blue-collars sample.
Worker-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity), share
of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) reports the OLS specification. The FE specification in column (2) includes worker fixed effects. Column (3) distinguishes between experience in small and big firms.
Column (4) allows the return on small and big firm experience to be different according to the size status of the firm. Column (5) features firm fixed effects while introducing a control for job changes both alone and
interacted with the size status of the employing firm in t. Column (6) reports the Job-Spell FE specification using firm-worker FE instead of separate worker and firm FE. The Individual Linear Trends specification
in column (7) includes both standard worker fixed effects as well as the interactions between separate worker fixed effects and a linear trend. The Heterogeneous Returns on Experience specification in column (8)
instead uses worker and firm FE while adding two interaction terms of worker FE with small and big experience. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the worker level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗
indicates that the coefficients of small and big firm experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of small firm experience with worker FE and big firm experience with worker FE) are significantly different from
each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with high-dimensional fixed
effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation procedure. For example, in the case of worker fixed effects in column (2) the number of observations
does not include worker for which only one observation is available. Such workers are instead included in the number of observations in column (1).
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Table C-13: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, International Experience vs. High-Layer Experience, Horse-
Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Int. Exp. Low-L. Firms Int. Exp. High-L. Firms High-L. Exp. Dom. Firms High-L. Exp. Int. Firms
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0369a -0.0219a
(0.0049) (0.0041)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0345a∗∗ 0.0382a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0466a∗∗ 0.0509a∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0034a 0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0004)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0026a 0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0007)
Domestic Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) -0.0002 0.0145a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002)
International Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0006 0.0288a∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0004)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0551a 0.0583a 0.0761a 0.1106a
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0189a 0.0037c
(0.0026) (0.0020)
Job Mobility * High-layer Firm (Dummy) -0.0089a -0.0096a
(0.0029) (0.0022)
High-layer Firm (0/1) -0.0119a -0.0376a
(0.0045) (0.0038)
Low-layer Exp. (Yrs) 0.0182a∗∗ 0.0267a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004)
High-layer Exp. (Yrs) 0.0240a∗∗ 0.0214a∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Low-layer Exp. * High-layer Firm (Yrs) 0.0003 -0.0018a
(0.0004) (0.0004)
High-layer Exp. * High-layer Firm (Yrs) -0.0010 0.0041b
(0.0015) (0.0016)
Low-layer Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) -0.0002 -0.0037a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
High-layer Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) -0.0001 0.0053a∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0007)
Observations 37,950 108,715 33,268 80,847
R-squared 1.0000 0.9982 1.0000 1.0000
Manager-Year Controls X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Manager FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table proposes some variants of the heterogeneous returns specification of column (3) of Table 9. The dependent variable is the (log) hourly
wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum of the monthly base wage
(gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of the monthly normal and overtime
hours of work. Regressions are run on the young managers sample. Manager-year controls include number of years of education as well as tenure in the
firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent labour productivity), share of skilled workers and
log firm age. Column (1) compares the returns on domestic and international experience in the sub-sample of young managers employed by low-layer
firms. Column (2) compares the returns on domestic and international experience in the sub-sample of young managers employed by high-layer firms.
Column (3) compares the returns on low-layer firms and high-layer firms experience in the sub-sample of young managers employed by domestic firms.
Column (4) compares the returns on low-layer firms and high-layer firms experience in the sub-sample of young managers employed by internationally
active firms. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic
and international experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of domestic experience with the manager FE and international experience with the
manager FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. ∗∗ also indicates that the coefficients of low-layer firms and high-layer firms
experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of low-layer firms experience with the manager FE and high-layer firms experience with the manager
FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe
implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to
the actual number of observations used by the estimation procedure.
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Table C-14: Wage Regressions, Main Covariates, International Experience vs. Big Experience, Horse-Race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Inter. Exp. Small Firms Inter. Exp. Big Firms Big Exp. Domestic Firms Big Exp Inter. Firms
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0326a -0.0082b
(0.0062) (0.0038)
Domestic Exp. (Yrs) 0.0400a∗∗ 0.0348a∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0570a∗∗ 0.0505a∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0007)
Dom. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0041a 0.0007c
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0107a 0.0012c
(0.0013) (0.0007)
Domestic Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) -0.0001 0.0098a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002)
International Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0001 0.0282a∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0004)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0592a 0.0546a 0.0787a 0.1019a
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Job Mobility * Int. Act. Firm (Dummy) -0.0121a 0.0003
(0.0030) (0.0019)
Job Mobility * Big Firm (Dummy) -0.0195a -0.0069a
(0.0023) (0.0020)
Big Firm (0/1) 0.0229a 0.0614a
(0.0060) (0.0064)
Small Experience (Yrs) 0.0191a 0.0200a∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Big Experience (Yrs) 0.0178a 0.0296a∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Small Experience * Big Firm (Yrs) -0.0026a 0.0014a
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Big Experience * Big Firm (Yrs) -0.0028a -0.0030a
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Small Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) -0.0000 0.0039a∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Big Exp. * Manager FE (Yrs) 0.0008c 0.0258a∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Observations 30,839 116,265 42,238 104,719
R-squared 1.0000 0.9984 1.0000 0.9989
Manager-Year Controls X X X X
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Manager FE X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table proposes some variants of the heterogeneous returns specification of column (3) of Table 9. The dependent variable is the
(log) hourly wage, detrended using a full set of year dummies interacted with 1-digit sector dummies. The hourly wage is defined as the sum
of the monthly base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), overtime, regularly and irregularly paid supplements, divided by the sum of
the monthly normal and overtime hours of work. Regressions are run on the young managers sample. Manager-year controls include number of
years of education as well as tenure in the firm and its square. Firm-year controls include firm size (log employment), productivity (log apparent
labour productivity), share of skilled workers and log firm age. Column (1) compares the returns on domestic and international experience in
the sub-sample of young managers employed by small firms. Column (2) compares the returns on domestic and international experience in
the sub-sample of young managers employed by big firms. Column (3) compares the returns on small firms and big firms experience in the
sub-sample of young managers employed by domestic firms. Column (4) compares the returns on small firms and big firms experience in the
sub-sample of young managers employed by internationally active firms. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a
p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. ∗∗ indicates that the coefficients of domestic and international experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of
domestic experience with the manager FE and international experience with the manager FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5%
level. ∗∗ also indicates that the coefficients of small firms and big firms experience (or the coefficients of the interactions of small firms experience
with the manager FE and big firms experience with the manager FE) are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. All results refer
to OLS estimations obtained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal
with high-dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation
procedure.
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Table C-15: Wage Regressions, Main Covari-
ates, Overall Experience and International Ex-
perience
(1)
VARIABLES Mobility & Firm FE
Int. Act. Firm (0/1) 0.0018
(0.0057)
Overall Exp. (Yrs) 0.0329a
(0.0019)
International Exp. (Yrs) 0.0184a
(0.0015)
Over. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0006
(0.0008)
Int. Exp. * Int. Act. Firm (Yrs) -0.0004
(0.0013)
Job Mobility (Dummy) 0.0599a
(0.0051)









Notes: Estimations refer to the same sample used in column (5)
of Table 8 as well as to a very similar specification in which, rather
than considering domestic and international experience, we con-
sider overall experience and international experience. Standard
errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the manager level. a
p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1. Results refer to OLS estimations ob-
tained with the Stata user-written routine reghdfe implementing
Guimarães and Portugal (2010)’s methodology to deal with high-
dimensional fixed effects. The reported number of observations
refers to the actual number of observations used by the estimation
procedure.
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